Strangers in the Land

PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM
1860-1925

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Chapter Two

The Age of Confidence

[She] gathers the chosen of her seed
From the hunted of every crown and creed.

* * *

Fused in her candid light,
To one strong race all races here unite.

—Bayard Taylor, "Centennial Ode"

*Faugh a Ballagh!* The Gaelic cry rang out through dense fog and gunsmoke as a wave of Union troops surged up the heights behind ruined Fredericksburg. In their midst floated a green flag bearing the golden harp of Ireland. For fifteen minutes Confederate cannon and muskets poured down volley after volley from impregnable positions a few paces away. At the end of the carnage two-thirds of General Thomas Meagher’s Irish Brigade were left crumpled on the field.

About the same time, a little band of dispirited men came together in New York City for the last recorded meeting of the Grand Executive Committee of the Order of United Americans. The largest of the nonpolitical nativistic associations, the O.U.A. had spread through sixteen states in the early 1860’s, trumpeting a message of hatred and fear of immigrants and Catholics. Now a demoralized remnant could no longer pay its bills or secure a quorum at consolidated meetings.

One ended in glory while the other expired in neglect, but the death of Irishmen at the Battle of Fredericksburg and the death of the O.U.A. on the home front were connected and symptomatic. All over the country foreign-born Americans flocked to the colors.

Five hundred thousand of them served in the Union armies alone, often organized in their own companies, regiments, and even divisions. Everywhere the anti-foreign movement of prewar years melted away. The very heart of Know-Nothings, the American party, vanished in 1860, its last surviving strength passing into the Constitutional Union party which stood for nothing but the preservation of the nation. The Sons of America, once mighty in Pennsylvania, succumbed when the war began. A mere fragment of the Order of United American Mechanics remained in existence. The war completed the ruin of organized nativism by absorbing xenophobes and immigrants in a common cause. Now the foreigner had a new prestige; he was a comrade-at-arms. The clash that alienated sections reconciled their component nationalities.

While quieting old anxieties, the war raised new ones; but in only two special instances did these concern foreign groups. The fearful draft riots that rocked New York for four days in 1863 arose principally from the discontents of the city’s Irish working class. The convulsion was widely interpreted as a disloyal Irish conspiracy inspired by Confederate agents. Out of the horror that the rioting produced, came an effort to revive the Know-Nothings movement, but it passed swiftly and without consequence. Altogether, the nativistic repercussions of the event were slight in comparison to the provocation.

Suspicions of disloyalty also touched the Jews during the war years. Too small a group to contribute noticeably to the armed forces, they had only recently won prominence in America as retail merchants and clothing manufacturers. At a time when war profiteering was rife and traders of all sorts were swarming through Union lines to smuggle and speculate in southern cotton, the Jews were often singled out for exploiting the war effort. In 1862 General U. S. Grant curtly ordered every Jew expelled from his military jurisdiction—an act that may stand as the principal nativistic incident of the war years.

Three weeks later, on instructions from Lincoln, the order was revoked.

These ripples of distrust were slight compared to the storm of hatred which lashed anti-war groups of native background. The great fear of an internal menace in the North concerned homespun Copperheads. Mob attacks on anti-war newspapers and even an occasional lynching of a suspected secessionist replaced the nativis-
tic riots of the 1850's. One patriotic citizen of Illinois described her Copperhead neighbors as "worse than the meanest thing a person can think of... Threatening what they will Do with Women Murdering Them if They can get a Chance... Oh they are to lowlife to let walk on gods Green Earth." While nativism withered, nationalism flourished.

In addition to the psychological bonds of a common enmity, the war forged between American ethnic groups the ties of a common economic need. Foreign-born civilians served the Union cause behind the lines in as important a way as foreign-born soldiers at the front. From the depopulated farms and straining factories of the North came clamorous demands for immigrant labor. In 1864 Congress revived an eighteenth-century technique for stimulating the flow of fresh European manpower. A contract labor law authorized employers to pay the passage and bind the services of prospective migrants.

Postwar America Beckons

The statute did not long outlive the war that produced it, but the population hunger behind it grew more insatiable than ever in the following years. The immigrant might not have retained his wartime laurels for long if his peacetime services had not loomed so large. As it was, the Civil War inaugurated an era of immense industrial, agricultural, and geographical expansion, in which the hundreds of thousands of annual arrivals from across the Atlantic seemed a national blessing. For two decades after Appomattox the summons to enrichment and opportunity smothered any serious nativist challenge. As the Civil War drew to a close, the Chicago Tribune sounded a jubilant keynote for the era ahead: "Europe will open her gates like a conquered city. Her people will come forth to us subdued by admiration of our glory and envy of our perfect peace. On to the Rocky Mountains and still over to the Pacific our mighty populations will spread... Our thirty millions will be tripled in thirty years." If the country did not quite live up to the Tribune's grandiose statistics, for twenty of those thirty years it echoed the paper's confident welcome.

Transatlantic migration was resumed in force when the war ended, and the throngs who came found the way prepared and a place awaiting them. Better transportation greatly shortened and tempered the rigors of the Atlantic crossing; for in the 1860's steamships replaced the old sailing vessels as carriers of human cargo. Once arrived, immigrants usually moved into a pattern of settlement created by earlier compatriots. In 1860 the proportion of foreign-born to the total population of the United States was already about what it would remain through 1920, and most of the immigrants were concentrated in urban areas. Indeed, the twenty-five principal cities had a higher percentage of foreign-born residents in 1860 than they have had since.

Nor did very notable changes occur, until the 1880's, in the nationalities involved or in their regional distribution. German immigration held the leading position it had attained in the late fifties, and it continued to pour chiefly into the Middle West, drawing increasing numbers of Bohemians and a scattering of Poles in its wake. British immigration (English, Scotch, and Welsh) rose to second place among the transatlantic currents. As skilled craftsmen, farmers, miners, and white-collar workers, the British diffused themselves more evenly throughout the country than any other group. Irish immigrants, although now less numerous than Germans or British, still came in large numbers. Now, as before the Civil War, Irishmen concentrated in the northeastern states. There they did most of the common-labor and found increasing opportunities as industrial workers, though mining attracted many to the Far West. Two other groups also sprang into prominence in the war and postwar years. Scandinavians, having established themselves in the prairies of the upper Mississippi Valley two decades before, began to migrate in great numbers in the 1860's. Unlike other nationalities, they avoided the cities for the most part, spreading instead westward across the plains. Meanwhile French Canadians, pulled southward by the Civil War, flocked to the mill towns of New England to compete with the Irish. Thus, by 1865, each nationality was vaguely familiar in the region that received it, and each had familiar tasks.

The fact that an earlier generation had cleared the paths they trod undoubtedly eased the immigrants' reception, but the basic condition of their popularity was the appetite for material growth and achievement that dominated postwar America. With only marginal dissent, the "Gilded Age" that Mark Twain satirized and
adored, the “Chromo Civilization” that E. L. Godkin criticized and defended, gave itself over to avid dreams of wealth. The headlong growth of business made the city, the machine, and the capitalist the controlling forces in American culture. The expansion of the railroad system, particularly, quickened the whole economy, opening up vast natural resources and creating a national market capable of absorbing them. The very real economic exploits of the age underwrote its booster spirit. There seemed no end to what the country could produce with men enough to do the work and to buy the results. The immigrants served both ways. And business leaders, marveling that population growth kept pace with economic opportunities, saw in the flow of immigration the workings of one of the grand laws of nature. 

Many businessmen, unwilling to leave matters entirely in the hands of a beneficent fate, actively expedited the immigrant traffic. Here the railroads played a key role, as they did throughout the economy. Railroads that pushed boldly into the empty West had a wilderness to settle. They needed immigrants not just for construction but to buy the great railroad land grants and to insure future revenues. Following the example set by the Illinois Central in the 1850’s, the Burlington, the Northern Pacific, and other lines sent agents to blanket northern Europe with alluring propaganda. Other real estate interests sometimes organized similar campaigns. “The real estate owners,” said the head of a group of speculators planning to advertise in Europe, “are the parties who make money out of immigrants immediately on their arrival.”

Nearly everyone who had something to sell or something to produce hoped to make money out of immigrants. Merchants looked to immigration for a growing supply of customers, and organized in various localities to attract it. In the early eighties, the Immigration Association of California, formed by members of the San Francisco Board of Trade, established hundreds of contacts with agents in Europe. Mining enterprises from Pennsylvania to the Rockies were chiefly dependent on foreign-born labor; manufacturing was only somewhat less so. By 1870 about one out of every three employees in manufacturing and mechanical industries was an immigrant—a proportion which remained constant until the 1920’s. New England factory owners actively recruited labor in

French Canada, and others may have done the same in Europe. Even in 1882, when immigration reached its highest point in the nineteenth century, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle greeted it as a foundation for unparalleled business expansion. 

The general public shared the businessman’s inclination to evaluate the newcomers in tangibly economic terms. There were elaborate calculations (how characteristic of the Gilded Age!) putting a price tag on immigrants in order to fix their per capita contribution to national wealth. Statisticians of the United States Treasury Department settled upon $800 as the average monetary value of an immigrant. Amateur mathematicians showed less restraint. One valued immigrants at $1,000 apiece on the ground that each was worth twice as much as an ante-bellum slave. Andrew Carnegie raised the estimate to $1,500. In a generation of exuberant materialism and expansive confidence, the figure of the immigrant seemed truly touched with gold.

The federal government smiled on the transatlantic influx and for a time toyed with schemes to assist it. The Republican party in 1868 and 1872 promised to continue to encourage immigration, as it had done during the Civil War, but after the repeal of the contract labor law in 1868 the customary laissez faire policy again prevailed. In 1874 Congress nearly abandoned its traditional opposition to special privileges for immigrant groups when it appeared that thousands of Mennonites might go to Canada instead of the United States unless a great block of public lands was set aside for them. Some Congressmen objected to offering any group “a separate right to compact themselves as an exclusive community,” whereupon three western states held out the enticement of exemption from militia service. (Most of the Mennonites came.)

Thus, in the end, official promotion of immigration was left to the states.

The demand for immigrants was most widespread and intense outside the densely populated states of the Northeast; in the West and South, virtually every state appointed agents or boards of immigration to lure new settlers from overseas. Michigan began the practice in 1845. By the end of the Civil War the northwestern states were competing with each other for Europeans to people their vacant lands and develop their economies. Then the South joined in, hoping to divert part of the current in its direction in
order to restore shattered commonwealths and replace emancipated Negroes. In the 1860's and 1870's, at least twenty-five out of the thirty-eight states took official action to promote immigration. South Carolina, in its desperation, added the inducement of a five-year tax exemption on all real estate bought by immigrants.  

Although economic incentives obviously fired the national lust for population, they alone do not explain it. If opportunities for immediate profit had formed a sufficient basis for a receptive attitude toward foreign groups, the long, searing depression of 1873-1877 would surely have killed such sympathies and desires. Actually, the campaign to stimulate European immigration slackened during the depression without by any means dying out. Hard times contributed powerfully to an exclusionist movement against the Chinese but did not substantially affect the status of the European. Two other conditions sustained the reign of confidence when the economy sagged. Of utmost significance was the survival in public opinion of a general, undaunted indifference to America's accumulating social problems. This complacent mood contrasted sharply with the spirit of ferment, unrest, and reform in the Know-Nothing era. Then the slavery crisis had brought to a head a multitude of discontents and dissatisfaction with the status quo. Reformers talked in their purposes had turned upon Catholics and foreigners as the "real" obstacles to progress; frightened conservatives had found in alien influx the "true" explanation of social discord.  

Now, however, there was no domestic cleavage deep enough to produce comparable anxieties and no nation-wide agitation to awaken the sleeping conscience of society. Untroubled by doubts of the success of their own institutions, Americans saw little reason to fear the influence of foreigners upon them. Confidence in the country's economic vitality extended, by and large, to its whole social order.

Certainly there was much in American life to justify uneasiness: corruption, peculation, undisciplined wealth, rural blight, and urban squalor on perhaps an unprecedented scale. But the only organized, sustained protest—that of farmers in conflict with the railroads—failed to shake the general public or to touch on problems related to immigration. This was a day when complacency ruled college and pulpit, when labor remained largely unorganized and politicians largely undisturbed. An occasional exception may help to prove the rule. At the end of the 1860's, the extortions of the Tweed Ring in New York City, supported to a considerable degree by Irish votes, aroused an outraged middle-class opposition. In the process, leading civic reformers struck a good many nativistic blows at "the rule of the uncultivated Irish Catholics." For a time the crusading cartoonist, Thomas Nast, flayed the Catholic Church, the Irish, and Tweed with equal fury.  

After the Boss's ouster, however, reform subsided. It was sporadic throughout the period, and in general New Yorkers seemed to accept the increasing power of the Irish in municipal politics with apathy.  

If indifference to domestic problems saved the foreign-born from some lines of attack, indifference to international problems saved them from others. Conflict between nations is, of course, a fruitful source of nativism when an internal minority is somehow connected with the hostile power. The first great wave of American nativism, in 1798, grew in large measure out of the internalization of an undeclared war with France; for much of the immigrant population on that occasion appeared pro-French.

In the period after the Civil War, however, the United States probably felt more secure from interference by European powers than it did at any other time. Isolation was a fact more than a theory. "Surrounded as we are, by two mighty oceans," said an ardent nationalist, "our Republic can never fall, as others have, by a foreign foe."  

Comforted by knowledge of its military security, the country tolerated Irish Fenian activities which would certainly have provoked a good deal of tension in other contexts. With impunity, Americans indulged their own Anglophobia and allowed Irish-Americans to do the same in more violent ways. For five years the Fenians, without arousing significant resentment, attacked Canada from American territory, organized revolts in Ireland, and tried to incite war with Britain.  

Untroubled by dangerous adversaries abroad, the United States could work out its own group relations in isolated safety.

Cosmopolitan Traditions

There was nothing new about the positive response of postwar America to European-born minorities. The conditions of the period—economic opportunity, social stability, and international security
—did not create but merely sustained and perpetuated a set of broadly tolerant attitudes. Over the centuries, America had developed a fluid, variegated culture by incorporating alien peoples into its midst, and the experience had fixed in American thought a faith in the nation’s capacity for assimilation. This faith, carrying with it a sense of the foreigner’s essential identification with American life, expressed itself in a type of nationalism that had long offset and outweighed the defensive spirit of nativism. A cosmopolitan and democratic ideal of nationality made assimilation plausible to Americans, and the immediate situation made it possible.

“E pluribus unum” expressed the essence of America’s cosmopolitan faith—an conviction that this new land would bring unity out of diversity as a matter of course. Intellectually, this conviction was rooted in Christian and democratic values. Along with the parochialisms, the fanaticisms, and the xenophobias that Christianity has nourished, it has had another, perhaps more important, side. The ancient Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man proclaimed the ultimate similarities between all peoples and their capacity for dwelling together in unity. The democratic values enshrined in the Declaration of Independence postulated an equal opportunity for all to share in the fullness of American life. Both Christian universalism and democratic egalitarianism had withstood the nativist ferment of the ante-bellum period. Both had vitalized George W. Julian’s fiery condemnation: “Know Nothingism... tramples down the doctrine of human brotherhood. It judges men by the accidents of their condition, instead of striving to find a common lot for all, with a common access to the blessings of life.”

The twin ideals of a common humanity and of equal rights continued in the 1870’s and 1880’s to foster faith in assimilation. Temporarily the tasks of postwar reconstruction even widened assimilationist ideals; for the Radical Republicans’ effort to redeem the southern Negro, to draw him within the pale of the state, and to weld the two races into a homogeneous nationality discouraged emphasis on basic human differences. To James Russell Lowell, for example, just and equal treatment of black men meant simply an enlargement of the Christian mission which the United States had long performed in bringing together the peoples of all nations in a common manhood. And Elisha Mulford, philosopher of Reconstruction, argued that the nation “is inclusive of the whole people. . . . There is no difference of wealth, or race, or physical condition, that can be made the ground of exclusion from it.”

Out of such assumptions, Americans fashioned an image of themselves as an inclusive nationality, at once diverse and homogeneous, ever improving as it assimilated many types of men into a unified, superior people. According to this long and widely respected view, the Americans derived some of their very distinctiveness as a nationality from the process of amalgamation. “We are the Romans of the modern world,” boasted Oliver Wendell Holmes, “the great assimilating people.” The boast went back at least to the Revolutionary period, when the founders of the American nation needed to distinguish their own national character from that of the mother country. The French observer Crevecoeur phrased the classic definition: the American is a “new man,” risen out of a blend of a half-dozen lesser peoples. No exclusive group could possibly combine the many excellences which America received from its varied origins.

In short, American nationality was emerging from a melting pot that functioned automatically. Few in the nineteenth century used the metaphor, but many shared the idea. De Witt Clinton, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Walt Whitman all glorified the fusion, through immigration, of a mixed and still developing people. Herman Melville gave this cosmopolitan belief its noblest expression: “We are the heirs of all time, and with all nations we divide our inheritance. On this Western Hemisphere all tribes and peoples are forming into one federated whole; and there is a future which shall see the estranged children of Adam restored as to the old heathenstone in [an American] Eden... The seed is sown, and the harvest must come.”

By mid-century, the concept of a mixed, assimilating nationality acquired a vaguely “racial” import: a mixed race has physical and moral qualities superior to one inbred, and in the United States the best intermingling has occurred. Thereafter, a host of intellectuals endorsed the nationally invigorating results of racial mixture. The most popular preacher of the day, Henry Ward Beecher, considered the cultural and religious peculiarities of the immigrants inconvenient but also inconsequential in comparison with their enrichment of American blood.
Support came also from new philosophical and scientific enthusiasms. English scientists, including Darwin himself, offered a compelling explanation for the success of the American melting pot, maintaining that migration functions as a process of natural selection, bringing the most energetic men from all parts of Europe to the New World. Herbert Spencer, the great philosopher of evolution, provided direct confirmation. In a celebrated interview in 1883 he predicted from "biological truths" that immigration and intermixture would produce here a finer, more adaptable type of man than the world had yet known.  

Spencer's principal opponent, William T. Harris, reasoned from cultural rather than naturalistic grounds to the same conclusion. Hegelian dialectic led him to believe that a new synthesis of nationalities was forming in America, with universal toleration and sympathies. The process, he thought, was farthest advanced in the most cosmopolitan region, the Mississippi Valley. Ultimately, Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier hypothesis would restate the notion in physiographical terms: "In the crucible of the frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race, English in neither nationality nor characteristics."  

In one way or another, the age of confidence resounded with assertions that America's "cosmopolitan character in the future is assured, [and] the peaceful blending of many nationalities has resulted in the 'survival of the fittest.'"  

Together with this ideal of nationality, the Americans embraced a similarly cosmopolitan interpretation of their national mission. One doctrine complemented the other. Patriots who rejoiced in the strength of a universal heritage expected their nation to perform a universal service. Like the theory of nationality, the concept of a national mission fused Christian with democratic values in the heat of the American Revolution. In revolting from British authority, the colonists looked upon their bid for freedom as service to a world-wide cause. They were realizing—so they thought—the free, rational life of which Europe dreamed but which Europe denied. To fulfill their cosmopolitan task it behooved them to provide for others a haven from Europe's oppressions. Thus Americans could enlist in the cause of general human liberty without actively intervening anywhere.  

Tom Paine's Common Sense struck the keynote in urging a declaration of independence. Not England, but all of Europe is America's parent, he said, for the New World has sheltered freedom-loving refugees from many countries. Since oppression is triumphing elsewhere, America must prepare an asylum for mankind.  

Thereafter, the idea of America's mission to provide a home for the oppressed became a cliché and an incantation. Like the theory of mixed nationality, it affirmed the superiority of the United States over Europe and the patriotic significance of a liberal immigration policy.  

During the third quarter of the nineteenth century American sympathies for European revolutionists perceptibly diminished, but the theme of refuge from oppression still had a general appeal. An English visitor in 1866, gazing on New York's rickety immigrant depot, commented, "Every true republican has in his heart the notion that his country is pointed out by God as a refuge for the distressed of all the nations." Even the struggling xenophobic society, the United American Mechanics, felt compelled to acknowledge that it did not "forget that our land should be an asylum for the oppressed." Nor did the business interests that profited from immigration fail to refer to America's role in succoring the oppressed.  

But it was among the victims of oppression that the dream of an American refuge struck real fire. Significantly, a Jewish-American poet aroused by Russian pogroms to a consciousness of America's mission put the asylum theory more eloquently than anyone else. When Emma Lazarus wrote in aid of a fund-raising campaign for the Statue of Liberty, the old ideal flashed through the condescending humanitarianism of her phrases:  

Give me your tired, your poor,  
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,  
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,  
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,  
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!  

The Ethnocentric Residue  

Yet the condescension was there too, along with the cosmopolitanism. Emma Lazarus' image of the immigrants as "tempest-tost"
and yearning to breathe free reflected one aspect of the spirit of her age; her picture of them as wretched refuse mirrored another. And the two were not incompatible. They dwelt together in poetry and in public opinion. From one point of view the immigrants symbolized the force of freedom pulling men through a golden door. From another they looked poor and huddled and unattractive. The two judgments could coexist because they were of a very different order from one another. The former image—positive and attractive—referred to the immigrant’s impact on the nation. In terms of his relation to national strength and survival, the immigrant appeared a blessing rather than a danger. The second, negative view referred to direct personal and social relations with the immigrant. The distinction is crucially important. It reminds us that unfavorable reactions to the personal and cultural traits of European peoples are not in themselves nativistic. They become so only when integrated with a hostile and fearful nationalism.

In 1884, near the close of the period, a magazine writer made the point very well and in doing so summed up both aspects of his generation’s response to the immigrants. “No one,” he said, “now accuses any large or influential portion of the foreign element of a set purpose to spread ideas subversive of our political institutions. Such tendencies and ideas as are most deprecated in the foreigners of the United States relate to manners, to mere habits of life and social practices.” In other words, the prevailing conditions and the dominant national ideals of the postwar era militated against nativism without dislodging a sense of superiority. An ethnocentrism that applied largely to “mere habits of life,” that raised no question of the newcomer’s patriotism or his ultimate assimilation, could survive side by side with a generally tolerant and receptive outlook.

Yet we cannot afford to ignore the simpler ethnocentric judgments that persist beneath the ebb and flow of nativism. Although those judgments often exist where nativism does not, they provide the cultural subsoil in which it grows. And, to complicate matters still more, we must recognize that the ethnocentric attitudes displayed toward different outside groups have their own great range of intensity.

In the absence of other disturbing factors, Americans rated lowest the nationalities most conspicuously remote in culture and race.

No variety of anti-European sentiment has ever approached the violent extremes to which anti-Chinese agitation went in the 1870’s and 1880’s. Lynchings, boycotts, and mass expulsions still harassed the Chinese after the federal government yielded to the clamor for their exclusion in 1882. At a time when the Chinese question had virtually disappeared as a political issue, a labor union could still refer to that patient people as “more slavish and brutish than the beasts that roam the fields. They are groveling worms.” Americans have never maintained that every European endangers American civilization; attacks have centered on the “scum” or “dregs” of Europe, thereby allowing for at least some implicit exceptions. But opponents of Oriental folk have tended to reject them one and all.

At the opposite end of the cultural spectrum, as Americans saw it, were the peoples of Britain and the Anglo-Canadians. These met so ready an acceptance that contemporary observers scarcely noticed their coming. Despite a persistent American hostility toward the English government and aristocracy, despite also the British immigrants’ tendency to remain loyal subjects of the Queen, they did not really seem foreigners at all. A sense of cultural identity exempted them from Anglophobia, and even recurrent international tensions between the two countries never disturbed the British immigrants’ status.

The Germans fared nearly but not quite so well. They insisted belligerently on their right to amusements that shocked the censorious—to card-playing, to beer gardens, to Sunday frolics; and when the temperance issue revived in the seventies the Chicago Tribune thought enforcement of a Sunday-closing law necessary to prevent “the German conquest” of the city. Then, too, the great German quarters of midwestern cities, full of saloons, foreign signboards, and German-language schools, seemed disturbingly self-contained. On the other hand, the Germans had a reputation for thrifty, honest, industrious, and orderly living. As for their recreational gusto, an increasingly urban world was pulling more and more Americans in the same direction. Indeed, the German example popularized beer-drinking and helped to relax America’s Sunday habits. In testifying to easy assimilation, an observer remarked in 1883, “The German notion that it is a good thing to have a good time has found a lodgment in the American mind.”
Distrust of Irish and Jews went deeper. As the pillars of an alien faith, the Irish attracted a good measure of any anti-Catholic sentiment that might be in the air; an Irishman’s loyalty to his priest was too firm for anxious Protestants to rest easily. And along with religious distrust went a social criticism. Americans pictured the Irish as rowdy ne'er-do-wells, impulsive, quarrelsome, drunken, and threadbare.45 Childhood conflicts gave these attitudes deep and early roots in many minds, for middle-class boys growing up in the American town of the late nineteenth century battled incessantly with roughneck Irish gangs from the other side of the tracks. “No relations except combat,” Henry Seidel Canby recalls, “were possible or thought of between our gangs and the ‘micks’ . . . They were still the alien, and had to be shown their place.”46 If this sense of social distance related partly to the unruly behavior of the Irish, it also pertained to their lowly economic status. In middle-class American eyes, the Irish were inferior not only because they were rowdies but also because they were poor. Impoverished Irish immigrants still squatted in tumble-down, one-room shanties on the fringes of the cities. Indignant property-owners in the vicinity continually petitioned against this “low and squalid class of people, who. . . keep . . . the surroundings in a filthy and disgusting condition.”47

The Irish stereotype, however, could not help but soften as more and more Irishmen rose out of the ranks of unskilled labor and merged in speech and manner with the older population. By the early eighties, they were generally well regarded. It was almost a proverb to say that a good workman does as much as an Irishman; and even the harshest critics of the Irish looked forward confidently to their assimilation.48

The Jews, on the other hand, lost in reputation as they gained in social and economic status. Alone among European immigrant groups, the Jews during this period met a distrust that spread along with their increasing assimilation. The nativistic criticism of Jewish loyalty that had risen during the Civil War vanished as soon as the war ended, but in its place there emerged during the 1870's a far more tenacious pattern of social discrimination.

Smallest of the prominent immigrant groups, American Jewry was largely a by-product of immigration from Germany. At first, native folk had difficulty in differentiating Jews from Germans,49 but with the dispersion of Jewish peddlers and shopkeepers throughout the country, the European tradition of the Jew as Shylock came to life. To a segment of American opinion, the Jews seemed clothed in greed and deceit. It was this conception that had exposed them to the charge of disloyal profiteering during the war. Thereafter the persistent Shylock image acquired a significant new dimension. It broadened during the Gilded Age into an indictment of Jewish manners for vulgarity and ostentation. The Jew, it now appeared, was not only mercenary and unscrupulous but also flamboyantly self-assertive—a tasteless barbarian rudely elbowing into genteel company.45 In line with this impression, society began to exclude Jews from areas of intimate social intercourse, the most celebrated of the initial proscriptions being at eastern summer resorts. Despite public shock and indignation when the leading hotel at Saratoga Springs refused to admit the eminent banker Joseph Seligman in 1877, many smaller establishments soon adopted the same policy.

Friendly observers conceded a grain of truth in the new indictment. By the 1870's many German Jews were prospering mightily, and a fair share of them had risen to affluence too rapidly to acquire the discipline of culture.46 Equally pertinent, however, was the pervasive vulgarity and the general social climbing that were upsetting the stability and simplicity of American society on a grand scale. In an age of parvenus the Jew provided a symbol of the parvenu spirit. Anti-Semitic discriminations subjected him to a discipline that native Americans could not so easily impose on themselves.

Despite their unusual social mobility, the Jews shared significantly in a common immigrant experience. Like the Irish and Germans, they faced criticism applied to “mere habits of life.” No one in the age of confidence denounced them as subversive or expressed doubts of their ultimate assimilation. German bonis vivans, Irish roughnecks, and Jewish vulgarians might seem discomforting; but the overriding assumptions of the immigrant’s economic value and of the American’s mixed nationality held anxious speculation firmly in check. In short, there was no pressing sense of the foreigner as a distinctively national menace. That could develop only with a loss of faith in the process of assimilation. In the postwar decades, nationalism was complacent and cosmopolitan.
Grant struck a similar campaign note at a veterans’ reunion that fall by hinting darkly that unless the public schools were kept free from sectarian influence the nation might face a new civil war between the forces of patriotism and intelligence on the one side and superstition and ignorance on the other. One Democratic Senator wryly commented that the Republican matadors were looking for another beast to slay now that Jeff Davis and the “bloody shirt” were losing their popular appeal. “The Pope, the old Pope of Rome, is to be the great bull that we are all to attack.”

In a few areas, notably New Jersey and Ohio, the Republicans reaped some advantage from the religious question in the 1875 elections, but the attempt to inflate it into a major national issue failed miserably. Grant’s annual message to Congress in December stressed the importance of a constitutional amendment forbidding the appropriation of public funds for denominational schools. The public received the idea with considerable apathy, however, and the Democratic House of Representatives moved to take the partisan sting out of it by passing a watered-down version almost unanimously. During the election of 1876 occasional Republican charges that the “Romish Church” was using the Democratic party to overthrow the American public school system made little impression. By then Catholic leaders had recognized the dangers of a militant course and had desisted from it.

Inevitably a measure of Protestant nationalism accompanied this anti-Catholic revival. Attacks on the Catholic Church as a foreign despoticism reappeared; the suspicion circulated that the priests were trying to subordinate the United States to Rome; there was even some murmuring over immigration. But by and large the controversy swirled around concrete institutional issues, involving relatively little talk of a papal conspiracy to subvert the nation. Above all, anti-Catholics dealt gently with the immigrants. Blame fell instead on the clergy. One foe of Rome contended that the Irish would assimilate if the priests did not keep them separate. Another thought that the priesthood drove the Irish into reluctant hostility to public education. Another acknowledged the innocence of Catholic laymen and held the hierarchy alone disloyal. The anti-Romanist editor of Harper’s Weekly praised America’s role as a refuge for the oppressed and its ability to assimilate all comers.
The mild temper of Protestant nativism in the seventies is best evidenced by the new secret society that it produced. The Order of the American Union took form in New York City about 1870, modeled after the prewar Know-Nothing. Unlike the latter, however, it admitted all Protestants, native and foreign-born, to membership and confined its agitation to anticlerical issues; it called on the American people "of all nationalities" to unite against the political activities of the Catholic Church. The O.A.U. reached a peak in 1875 with about forty councils in New York, a score in Ohio, and a scattered following elsewhere. In spite of high hopes, it had little success in influencing elections, and in 1878, while Edwin Cowles, editor of the Cleveland Leader, was president of the order, an expose published in the New York Herald caused its rapid disintegration.46

Another set of events in the 1870's, quite different from those on which anti-Catholicism rested, lent some slight encouragement to the anti-radical tradition. Like the fear of popery, the fear of imported discontent barely scratched the armor of national confidence; yet it was in this period that anti-radical nativism assumed a distinctively modern aspect. Because Marxism and allied social-revolutionary doctrines were taking hold among foreign workingmen, revolution was acquiring a new significance. Henceforth it would mean, for the most part, not the replacement of monarchy by liberal democracy, but rather the uprising of the working class against capitalism. Americans cast dark glances across the Atlantic at the Paris Commune of 1871, and a few observers saw in it a portent of future convulsions between labor and capital.48 Here and there some conservatives were beginning to associate working-class aspirations with revolutionary violence. Since revolutionary doctrines and organizers, although pathetically weak, came almost entirely from Europe, the old conjunction of immigration and radicalism could assume a new scope and aspect. Class conflict could appear an un-American product of foreign agitators.49

The Paris Commune sowed one seed of this suspicion. Another was planted with the formation in the 1870's of the first socialist party in America, a largely immigrant organization. The industrial violence of the Molly Maguires in the Pennsylvania coal fields left a third. But the concept of a labor revolution instigated by foreigners really crystallized during the sudden, wild fury of the railroad strikes of 1877. Goaded by repeated wage cuts, railroad workers and others battled with state militia, pillaged trains, and rioted from Baltimore to San Francisco. This outburst of unorganized, undirected misery was a new phenomenon in America. To frightened nativists, the light of flaming boxcars revealed the hand of the foreign "communist." Panic-stricken over the safety of his family, John Hay cowered at home and believed the government utterly helpless in the face of a rebellion of foreign workingmen. The New York Herald asserted that foreign demagogues "have imported ideas and sentiments which have repeatedly deluged France in blood ... The railroad riots ... were instigated by men incapable of understanding our ideas and principles." Congressman James A. Garfield assured his constituents that trouble between capital and labor stemmed from foreign radicalism.50

In California, Garfield's point seemed particularly evident. There the unrest of 1877 produced the Workingmen's party, led by a demagogue of Irish birth, Denis Kearney, who raved against both the rich and the Chinese. The radical agitation of anti-Chinese immigrants inspired an anti-radical, anti-European reaction among old-stock conservatives. Frank Pixley, a former Know-Nothing now closely associated with Leland Stanford of the Southern Pacific Railroad, sparked the new xenophobia. Pixley's weekly journal, the Argonaut, sympathized mildly with the anti-Chinese sentiment among the working people of San Francisco until Kearney's wild threats filled the air. Then the Argonaut forgot the Chinese and turned on the labor movement as a foreign insurrection. Let us prepare, Pixley thundered, to meet these aliens "with ball and bayonet." Henceforth the paper was furiously and inverently anti-foreign.51

As in the case of anti-Catholicism, however, much anti-radical sentiment in the age of confidence lacked nativistic significance. Conservatives often linked radical ideas with a discontented lower class without invoking foreign influence.52 More important, hardly anyone seriously believed that insurrectionary immigrants could endanger American institutions. Except in moments of panic such as Hay experienced, the peril of revolution seemed too novel to be genuinely credible. The Nation probably expressed a common conservative judgment on the railroad strikes: "The kindest thing which can be done for the great multitudes of untaught men who
have been received on these shores, and are daily arriving, and who are torn perhaps even more here than in Europe by wild desires and wilder dreams, is to show them promptly that society as here organized, on individual freedom of thought and action, is impregnable, and can be no more shaken than the order of nature." All in all, the thunderclap of 1877 passed too quickly to damage America's faith in its "impregnable" society. But the events could not be forgotten, and it was by no means certain that confidence would survive serenely another such upheaval.

If confidence inhibited the established nativist traditions, it positively suffused the Anglo-Saxon cult. This too found new sources of support in postwar America, yet it failed completely to register a nativistic impact.

With the decline of expansionist sentiment on the eve of the Civil War, the Anglo-Saxon doctrine lost its popular vogue, but it retained a hold on the cultivated classes. Among them it won increasing intellectual prestige in the seventies and eighties. Undoubtedly the most important reason for the trend lay in the pride of ancestry stimulated by the chaotic social climbing of the Gilded Age. At a time when parvenus were managing practical affairs and clamoring for admission to the choicest circles, there was compensation and a measure of status in associating one's personal lineage with the original fount of national greatness. Thus Anglo-Saxonism became a kind of patrician nationalism. As such it synchronized with the enormous influence which English ideas, English literature, and English social standards were securing among the American elite. England's "scientific" historians offered fresh documentation for the racial doctrine, with support for the Teutonic version from German sources; English lecturers campaigned personally; even the English religious cult of Anglo-Israel carried across the Atlantic the doctrine that the Anglo-Saxons were God's chosen people. These Anglophile currents affected particularly the Brahmin gentry of New England, and New Englanders did much to spread them elsewhere in the country.

Also, in a general way, the rise of Darwinism in the post-Civil War period helped to encourage interest in hereditary and therefore in racial determinants. As early as 1873 a clergyman described the "American race" as "a sprout of the Anglo-Saxon stock, which, all fresh and vigorous, asserts its Darwinian right to exist." All of these factors—the quest for ancestors, the influence of English culture, and the impact of the theory of biological evolution—came to focus in John Fiske. This magnetic publicist of ideas was enormously proud of the New Englander's ancestry and believed himself a lineal descendant of King Alfred. He browsed in English churchyards and drank deeply from England's leading Teutonist, E. A. Freeman. When Fiske shifted in the 1880's from popularizing Darwinian science to popularizing American history, he was well prepared to celebrate the glories of the English race in the New World.

Still the Anglo-Saxonists were pro rather than con. During the age of confidence almost no race-thinker directly challenged a tolerant and eclectic attitude toward other European groups. Instead, Anglo-Saxon and cosmopolitan nationalisms merged in a happy belief that the Anglo-Saxon has a marvelous capacity for assimilating kindred races, absorbing their valuable qualities, yet remaining basically unchanged. John Fiske, for example, exclaimed the American for quickly assimilating other European strains while remaining thoroughly English. If doubts arose of how this paradox could come about, the answer lay in the mixed character of England's early population: European immigration was simply recombing in the United States the strains which had earlier blended in English blood. In short, American race-thinkers harmonized their cultural bias with their traditional ideal of nationality. They retained confidence in assimilation, and in their outlook a certain cosmopolitan flavor remained.

The easy juggling of race concepts, which kept parochial and cosmopolitan ideas revolving in a single orbit, depended partly on the whole structure of national confidence and partly on the continuing vagueness of the race-idea. Whatever palpitations one might feel about a foreigner's political or religious loyalties, the notion that European immigrants might endanger the great inborn spirit of the nation strained credibility. The age was too optimistic to entertain such a fear, and the immigrants' own lineage seemed too closely connected with the great Gothic family to inspire alarm.

Anglo-Saxon nationalism, then, posed even less of an obstacle to the postwar mood of confidence than did the explicitly nativist themes. At least, anti-Catholicism had a flurry in the seventies, and
anti-radical nativism promised to be increasingly pertinent to an industrial society. All three traditions of national exclusiveness were tenacious and adaptable. But under the conditions of increasing familiarity with the principal immigrant nationalities, zeal for material progress, and indifference to social and international problems, none of the nativist traditions could blunt the nation's assimilationist and cosmopolitan creed.

Chapter Three

Crisis in the Eighties

The times are strangely out of joint. . . . Capital piles on capital, in combination reaching alpine heights. . . . The rich grow richer, and the poor become poorer; the nation trembles under the tread of discontented thousands; strikes are the order of the day.

—Speech in Kentucky legislature, 1890

. . . the old cry in favor of unrestricted immigration has almost entirely ceased.

—Franklin B. Sanborn, 1887

In 1882 a writer in the Atlantic Monthly predicted in ominous tones the coming of a great struggle for the preservation of the American social and economic order. During the course of various reflections on urban poverty and industrial discontent, the author turned aside at one or two points to assail the European immigrant with a bluntness and sweep perhaps unknown in a general magazine for a generation. What was significant was not so much the vague substance of the attack as the conclusion which it supported and to which the whole article pointed: “Our era . . . of happy immunity from those social diseases which are the danger and the humiliation of Europe is passing away . . . every year brings the conditions of American labor into closer likeness to those of the Old World. An American species of socialism is inevitable.”

Few observers in 1882 took so gloomy a view of the American future or of the place of the immigrant in it. Except for the Civil War crisis—now largely liquidated—the country had suffered no fundamental schism in all of the nineteenth century. It could look back upon an otherwise uninterrupted process of economic devel-
opment, westward expansion, and institutional crystallization. Surely only the most fretful of skeptics could doubt the uniqueness and fixity of the nation's destiny. Above all, nineteenth-century Americans had grown accustomed to congratulating themselves for having a society without basic cleavages. In contrast to Europe, with its more rigid division of classes, its more deeply entrenched inequalities, and its pent-up dissatisfaction, America seemed to have dissolved the external restraints on individual achievement. It was an article of faith that this land of opportunity had leveled all the barriers to individual mobility; and the corollary that a completely free society was an unshakable one appeared hardly less certain. Sheathed in the conviction, public complacency rode out the troubles of the 1870's. But on a few sensitive minds the stresses of the decade left unhealed scars, and by the early eighties voices of doubt were beginning to be heard. Were classes congealing, and did this sharpening alignment portend a relapse into the internal strife of Europe? Were American horizons really and permanently open, or were they contracting? Some who wondered took the first long, hard, new look at the immigrants.

**Social Charms and Anxious Reformers**

Although the bustling American scene in the early eighties wore a generally tranquil air, indications abounded that the issues thrust forward in the previous decade had not vanished in the first flush of renewed prosperity. The sodden wretchedness of the slums settled more deeply into the heart of great cities every year. The grip of vice and lawlessness on chaotic municipal governments kept the growing urban problem as far as ever from solution, until at last a régime of crime in Cincinnati goaded the populace to three terrible days of fire and riot in 1884. (“The dangerous tendencies of the population in large cities must be distinctly recognized,” the shocked New York *Tribune* editorialized.) Meanwhile a relentlessly advancing factory system cut off more and more employees from direct relations with their employers. In reaction, the first mass movement of American workingmen was in the making. Skilled and unskilled workers alike flocked to the mushrooming Knights of Labor, which cast off its early cloak of secrecy in 1881 and started to climb to national significance. This to many was the most startling portent of all, for the Knights' gusty enthusiasm spilled into a dozen reformist proposals, while Master Workman Terence Powderly thundered vague preachments on abolishing the "wage system."

At the other end of the scale, power and arrogance accumulated no less swiftly. Business combinations sprouted on all sides, many of them pressing toward monopoly. Henry Demarest Lloyd's pioneering exposé of the Standard Oil Company in 1881 supplied a dramatically documented illustration of a trend which was becoming increasingly hard to ignore. Many of the new tycoons did nothing to disguise it. This was the uninhibited period when William Vanderbilt rapped out his famous "The public be damned," when the United States Senate became known as a millionaire's club, when another business leader is supposed to have said that the rich own America and intend to keep it. With something of the same spirit the money-kings thrust upward in the social world, flaunting unheard-of riches with a fine abandon. A public which followed in the daily newspapers the doings of syndicates and rings and trusts was beginning to read in the comic magazines of Mrs. Astor's gilded balls and of Ward McAllister's pretentious attempts to define the "Four Hundred." These yawning social and economic contrasts became more evident still when the economy slid downhill in 1883, 1884, and 1885. Corporations cut wages savagely, sometimes as much as 20 per cent; unemployment mounted to a million or more; and though the slump was less severe than that of the seventies, poverty stared with fiercer eyes on wealth unshaken and untamed.

A parallel crisis impended in the rural West and South. It did not affect the immigrant's status as obviously or as directly as the urban cleavage did, but indirectly the farmers' anxieties heightened every tension in the cities. Ever since the Civil War the old sense of equality and opportunity had been slipping from the farmers' grasp. Monopoly touched the rural producer first and touched him hardest. Declining farm prices and rising debts made the middleman's grip all the more onerous, while the processes which piled up wealth in the cities ate away at the prestige of rural life.

Although good weather and good times hushed the farmers' complaints in the early eighties, urban America was not unaware that the countryside no longer promised a living to anyone willing to
work for it. Geographic as well as economic facts compelled attention in this regard. Homesteaders in the early eighties were swarming into the last great area of unsettled grasslands in the United States, peopling western Kansas and Nebraska, overthrowing the Dakotas, and colliding with cattlemen on the high plains of Montana, Wyoming, and Colorado. Despite the vast self-assurance with which the decade opened, those few who wondered about the hardening of class lines sometimes pondered also the shrinking promise of the frontier. In American thought an ingenuous faith in the open road westward had long supported belief in an open road upward. The eighties cast a shadow over both ideas at the same time. A new sense of “closed space” compounded the emerging fears of a closed society. As early as 1881 a letter writer in the New York Tribune averred that the next generation would find America’s resources and opportunities all parcelled out. “The nation,” he wrote, “has reached a point in its growth where its policy should be to preserve its heritage for coming generations, not to donate it to all the strangers we can induce to come among us.”

During the first half of the decade only a handful of Cassandras took so troubled a view of the American future that their conception of the immigrants soured. Wherever an optimistic indifference toward social problems prevailed, the tradition persisted of the immigrant as an economic blessing easily assimilated into America’s mixed nationality. On the whole, therefore, reformers and humanitarians discovered an immigration problem somewhat sooner than did conservative spokesmen. The latter had a vested interest in complacency; the former faced the crisis of the eighties early and with alarm.

One important effect of the crisis, in fact, was to awaken a torpid social conscience and to call forth a new body of middle-class reform opinion. Tugging in a dozen different directions at once, often intellectually vague and usually ineffective in practice, the reformers inaugurated a many-pronged criticism of the urban, industrial scene. Whatever the specific ills that caught their eye, the more anxious reform thinkers came back time and again to the great issue: the polarization of American society. They believed passionately in the traditional ideal of a fluid, homogeneous culture; yet they saw it threatened everywhere. Most of them, urbanites themselves, located the heart of the trouble in the recklessly expanding cities. And there, in teeming concentration, were the immigrants, linked in one way or another to every festering problem. It was not difficult for this early generation of urbanized reformers—full of dark forebodings and ill-experienced in realistic social analysis—to fix upon the immigrants as a major source of current disorders. Nor was it entirely unreasonable for men who feared a decline of opportunity and mobility to lose confidence in the process of assimilation. In discovering an immigration problem, the social critics of the eighties might not indulge in the characteristically nativist assault on the newcomer as a foreign enemy of the American way of life; they might not speak in the accents of nationalism. But they raised the question of assimilation in a broadly significant way by connecting it with the central issues of the day. They gave intellectual respectability to anti-immigrant feelings.

A restless Congregational clergyman sounded the great opening blast. Josiah Strong stood in the vanguard of the small company of religious thinkers who were bringing an ethical, evangelical imperative to the pattern of reform. Among the pioneering appeals to a new Christian conscience, Strong’s Our Country was the most apocalyptic. Published in 1885, this tremendously popular appeal for support of home missions radiated a sense of imminent crisis. It proclaimed great dangers focalizing in the cities, to religion, to morality, to politics. Above all it pointed to the danger of class strife and predicted eventually an open struggle between selfish rich and degraded poor. All these perils, Strong believed, were enhanced by immigration. He cast his anti-foreign complaints in a traditional mold, accusing the immigrants of crime and immorality, of corrupting municipal government, of furnishing recruits for Catholicism and socialism. But what made the words urgent and significant was a conviction that in each of these respects the foreign influx was hastening the onset of a terrible upheaval in American society. Although he neither hated immigrants as such nor preached the complete failure of assimilation, he delivered the first sweeping indictment of immigrant influence since the 1850’s.

The next year, in a series of lectures that attracted a good deal of attention, another clergyman stated Strong’s fears more explicitly. In the cities, said Samuel Loomis, men have become divided into two widely separated classes. On one side of the gulf are the business and professional people, mostly native-born and
Protestant. On the other is the working class, nearly all of it foreign in background, much of it Catholic, and the rest convinced that Protestantism serves only the well-to-do. * 

It remained for a newspaper reporter to demonstrate at the end of the decade the appalling width of the chasm. Jacob Riis's *How the Other Half Lives* (the title itself was significant) dramatized as nothing else did the full degradation and misery of immigrant lives in the slums. The conditions Riis described were not new, but his reaction to them was part of the new "Social Gospel." Passionately, he warned that only a Christian sense of justice could stop the dreadful wedge that greed was driving between the tenement dwellers and the upper classes. Since the slums and the foreign quarters coincided, Riis treated them as synonymous. In exposing the slums he was revealing the disorganization and squalor of their foreign residents. Although he generally wrote of the immigrants with sympathetic warmth and blamed "the evil they breed" on the conditions surrounding them, his book aroused anti-

nal on the need for sharp restriction of immigration, while another of the same group, Richmond Mayo-Smith, wrote the first scholarly book on the subject. *Emigration and Immigration* throughout showed Mayo-Smith's concern with national homogeneity and the discord threatening it. At a time when social and economic problems are pressing acutely upon us, is immigration, he asked, endangering America's free, self-reliant, orderly culture, the unique economic well-being of its working people, and the prestige of industrial pursuits? His answer, though measured and good-tempered, was emphatically yes. Meanwhile, in 1888, the American Economic Association, which these men founded, offered a prize of $150 for the best essay on "The Evil Effects of Unrestricted Immigration." * 

A similar outlook permeated many of the separate, middle-class reform movements that were fixing on particular social problems. Taking a new lease on life, crusaders for temperance and for women's rights assailed the immigrant's subversive, European attitudes on these questions. "Every reformatory movement of the day," declared a prohibitionist, "finds here its most persistent and indefatigable foe." 10 None agreed more loudly than the apostles of clean city government. The immigrants' votes did in fact go chiefly to the bosses, and during the Tweed régime civic reformers had already vented their wrath on both. In the mid-eighties, as the movement to redeem the cities became an organized crusade capable of more than futile protest, it displayed an unabashed nativism. George W. Curtis, a veteran of Tweed days, talked about the lack of patriotism in "the ignorant, lawless, idle and dangerous overflow of all other countries." New York's reform mayor, Abram S. Hewitt, although elected by Tammany, launched into pointblank attacks on the immigrant menace, ultimately picking a celebrated quarrel with his Irish Board of Aldermen over the propriety of flying the shamrock flag at City Hall on St. Patrick's Day. "America should be governed by Americans," he told the irate city fathers in 1888, and his supporters demanded that those who prefer another flag should go back where they came from. 14 

While all of these overlapping agitations centered on the stresses in urban America, another emerging reform group put the immigration issue in a rural context also. Opponents of land monopoly were quick to sense a relation between contracting horizons in the
West and uncontrolled immigration. Alarm over corporate exploitation of the public domain and an accompanying growth of tenancy was just beginning in the 1880s. Protests arose in hand with a new consciousness that the supply of good vacant land was dwindling, that it might soon give out. Once gone, where would the United States find room for its immigrant-inflated population? Henry George, the greatest of all the land reformers and one of the first Americans to rage at the country’s reversion toward European conditions, connected the closing of the safety valve of western land with the danger of immigration, as early as 1883. “What,” he queried, “in a few years more, are we to do for a dumping-ground? Will it make our difficulty the less that our human garbage can vote?” Like George, Josiah Strong predicted that when the public lands were gone, the immigrants would crowd the cities more and more, and the next year, 1886, a special investigator for the said North American Review announced that the evil day had arrived: at a time of growing immigration and land monopoly, “the public domain of the United States is now exhausted.”

With such considerations in mind, Congress enacted a law in 1887 prohibiting nondeclarant aliens (those who had not declared their intention to become citizens) from owning real estate in the federal territories. Although aimed chiefly at nonresident landlords, the law reflected concern about immigration and overpopulation as well. In the same year an agricultural collapse sent thousands reeling backward from the Great Plains. If the farmers themselves took little heed of the immigration issue as yet, their distresses lent weight to the incipient claustrophobia in the urban world.

Behind many of the miscellaneous complaints which reformers were bringing against the immigrants lay solid reality, although the critics generally exaggerated and misconstrued it. The day of the pioneer was passing, and it was becoming more difficult and costly to establish an independent farm. Immigration was flowing more than ever toward the cities, and there it did complicate the slum problem, strain the old moralities, strengthen boss rule, and accentuate the rift of classes. In these and other respects, however, the foreign-born played a relatively constant role in a rapidly changing situation. For a long time they had suffered from and added to the cultural dislocations inherent in the rise of an unregulated industrial economy. Yet the immigrants’ part excited slight alarm as long as the problems themselves did not seem pressing. The 1880s brought these long-germinating problems into a sharp focus and, by awakening a body of sensitive reform opinion, summoned forth the immigrant’s first cogent critics.

Meanwhile, one group of reformers in particular broke the way toward a new immigration policy. To the directors of urban charities, perhaps the most conservative of all the forces enlisted for social improvement, the immigrant had presented something of a problem even during the years of his highest repute. More or less constantly, relief agencies in the large cities had worried over the strain that immigrants imposed on their financial resources and on the life of the community. Although at the opening of the 1880s the general mood of crisis which was to develop during the decade barely flicked the horizon, philanthropists were deep in a miniature crisis of their own. To solve it they precipitated the first national controls over immigration. The immigration act of 1882, despite a limited scope and a tentative approach, laid the foundations for federal immigration restriction.

Previously, the federal government had taken notice of European immigrants in only two respects. It counted the number of entrants for statistical purposes, and it decreed certain minimum living conditions aboard ship. In default of other federal action, immigration remained a concern of the individual seaboard states. The states placed administration of their own feeble regulations in the hands of boards of unpaid charity leaders. The whole program aimed merely at an orderly reception, at helping those in temporary difficulty, and at discouraging the entry of the permanently incapacitated. New York, which received three-fourths of all newcomers, bore the main load. There the state Board of Commissioners of Emigration maintained a fund for supporting needy and distressed immigrants by collecting from shipowners a small fee in lieu of a bond for each alien landed. The state also hoped to forestall the most serious burdens by requiring a special bond for each immigrant who seemed likely to become a permanent charity case.

This loose system broke down under judicial attack. In 1876 the Supreme Court, in a nationalist mood, declared that the states’ practices unconstitutionally infringed on Congress’s exclusive
power to regulate foreign commerce. Henceforth New Yorkers would have to pay out of their own pockets for the supervision and care of immigrants unless the federal government assumed responsibility. Charity leaders were appalled. The burden now thrust upon them seemed especially heavy because under the impact of Darwinian ideas they were beginning to regard poverty—previously attributed to moral weakness—as an inherited tendency. "The hereditary character of pauperism and crime," said a leading welfare worker, "is the most fearful element with which society has to contend."

The New York Board of Emigration Commissioners and the New York Board of Charities immediately joined with similar agencies in other eastern states to press for federal regulation of immigration. Their proposals went beyond the old state system in two respects: they urged Congress to levy a small head tax directly on the immigrant to pay for administration and relief, and they wanted convicts and immigrants unable to support themselves positively excluded. This, they thought, would stop the influx of "confirmed paupers."

For six years Congress was unmoved. Business interests, particularly, resisted any action that might diminish immigration in the slightest. Finally, when conditions were becoming chaotic at New York's immigrant depot, the pressure of charity groups and of New York politicians succeeded. Pleading that hereditary European pauperism was incurable, they drove the federal government to assume partial jurisdiction. The immigration law of 1882 gave the Secretary of the Treasury executive authority over immigration but cautiously delegated the actual inspection of immigrants to existing state agencies. The United States was to accumulate an immigrant welfare fund by taxing each entrant the modest sum of fifty cents (New York had collected $1.50 from shipowners for each passenger). Also, convicts, lunatics, idiots, and persons likely to become a public charge were denied admission. Thus, without intending to restrict immigration, the United States took a hesitant but decisive step to control it.

Later in the decade, charity workers voiced a rising alarm at the whole foreign tide, and began to talk about general restrictions. So did other reformers; after 1885 their complaints about foreign influence frequently included demands for limiting it. But middle-

class reform never again played a determining role in making immigration policy, and the more popular the anti-foreign sentiment of the late nineteenth century became, the less the reformers contributed to its shaping. If broader segments of American society and thought had not also succumbed to a crisis mood, the nativist drift of the eighties would have been far less pronounced. In the middle years of the decade, men with all sorts of opinions and backgrounds were shaken loose from complacency, and turned fearfully against the stranger.

**Militant Labor and Adamant Capital**

In industrial society no other group comes into closer, more continuous contact with the immigrant population than the native workingmen. If anyone had cause for complaint against the foreign-born on grounds of substantial self-interest, it was the American hand who did much the same work, served the same boss, and often lived in the same neighborhood. Relations between the two, though frequently good-natured, were seldom entirely free from strain. The immigrant derived not only from a more or less alien culture but also from mean, impoverished circumstances. Entering the American economy on its lowest rungs, he commonly began by accepting wages and enduring conditions which Americanized employees scorned. In time the immigrants learned to demand more, and in the long run their manpower actually created more opportunities than it absorbed in the dynamic American economy of the nineteenth century.

American wage-earners, however, were impatient of long-run views during periods of hardship and stress. They eyed the foreigner for what he was at the moment—a cheap competitor, whose presence undoubtedly held down wages and bred unemployment in temporary local situations. And in a more general sense, workingmen could reasonably anticipate greater economic security through anti-foreign discriminations, just as industrialists could reasonably expect advantages from protective tariffs. Consequently, every anti-immigrant agitation in the nineteenth century had drawn support from the urban laboring class. It contributed a rowdy element to the Know-Nothings and gave birth to societies like the Order of United American Mechanics, and
sparked the repeal in 1868 of the Civil War statute encouraging
the importation of contract labor.21

The tremendous immigrant influx of 1882, followed by the in-
dustrial depression of 1883-1886, persuaded many wage-earners
that the whole incoming stream directly threatened their own
livelihood. In New York City an Independent Labor party peti-
tioned Congress to impose a head tax of $100 on each entrant.
Philadelphia saw the appearance of a National Home Labor League,
aiming "to preserve the American labor market for American
workingmen." About 1887 a poll of 869 Wisconsin workers in
varied occupations showed approximately half of them convinced
that immigration was injuring their trade.22

In the late eighties, workingmen of several states secured direct
discriminatory legislation against foreign labor. Virtually for the
first time, American legislatures excluded unnaturalized immigrants
of all nationalities from certain types of common employments.
These statutes, though slight in their immediate effects, marked
the beginning of a general departure from the old common law
tradition. Under the common law, aliens from friendly countries
suffered no general disqualifications in job-holding; except for posi-
tions requiring allegiance to the sovereign, they could work and
trade as freely as citizens.23 Several Pacific Coast states had ex-
cluded the Chinese from some occupations at an early date, and
California in 1850 had instituted an oppressive tax on all foreign
miners, but otherwise European immigrants apparently retained
full employment rights everywhere until the 1880's.24 Then, the
initial restrictions applied to the construction of public works--a
type of activity to which unskilled immigrant labor traditionally
flocked. Under the spur of widespread unemployment the United
States House of Representatives passed a bill in 1886 prohibiting
the employment on public works of any alien who had not de-
clared his intention to become a citizen. The Senate failed to act
on the proposal, but some of the states proceeded to adopt regula-
tions to the same effect. In 1889, Illinois, Wyoming, and Idaho
banned nondeclarant aliens from both state and municipal pro-
jects.25

Petty though the enactments and the feelings behind them were,
one may wonder why they did not materialize before this time.
Granted that economic stresses in the mid-eighties encouraged a

fear of immigrant competition, the question remains: Why did the
issue arise during and after so short-lived a depression, having re-
mained dormant through the much longer and more severe de-
pression of the 1870's? Were workingmen responding in their own
terms to misgivings that really transcended job consciousness, that
flowed out of the whole encompassing social crisis? Was there
something more than personal, economic resentment in a midwest-
ern carpenter's outburst in 1886: "We poor, native-born citizens
are just pulled around same as dogs by foreign people. We do not
stand any show, and it seems as though everything is coming to
the very worst in the near future unless free immigration is
stopped." 26

An answer is suggested by events in the coal fields of Penn-
sylvania, the region where militant anti-foreign sentiment gripped
the native working class earliest and most fiercely. In the seven-
ties and eighties the coal mining country was rapidly becoming
the industrial hell of the northeastern United States. More than
anywhere else perhaps, in those grimy company towns set in a
ravaged landscape, class cleavage mocked the historic American
promise of an open society. Nowhere did labor unrest cut more
depth. For a decade after 1865, strikes, lockouts, and suspensions
prevailed everywhere in the region, punctuated by the industrial
violence of the Molly Maguires.

The coal operators, already harried by chaotic overproduction,
pitilessly counterattacked. Some of them began in the 1870's to
bring in more docile laborers from Hungary and Italy.27 The New
York Times greeted these latter effusively, promising that the
United States would gladly transform a million Italian beggars into
prosperous citizens; but Pennsylvania miners took another view of
the matter. Since the new groups entered into an already tense
situation as creatures of the employers, they encountered resent-
ments that were more than ethnocentric and went beyond eco-
nomic competition. The immigrants seemed both symbols and
agents of the widening gulf between capital and labor. The hatred
of them was a hatred of the corporations for trying "to degrade
native labor by the introduction of a class who, in following the
customs of their ancestors, live more like brutes than human be-
ings." 28

From the outset the Slavic and Italian immigrants ran a gamut
of indignities and ostracisms. They were abused in public and isolated in private, cuffed in the works and pelted on the streets, fined and imprisoned on the smallest pretext, cheated of their wages, and crowded by the score into converted barns and tumble-down shanties that served as boarding houses. The first of them to arrive in western Pennsylvania, a group of Italian strikebreakers hired by the Armstrong Coal Works in 1874, were met by riots and armed attacks in which several of the newcomers were killed.\textsuperscript{26} The problem remained a local one through the seventies, a period in which Pennsylvania's total immigrant population from Poland, Italy, and Hungary never exceeded some seven thousand. In the next decade their numbers grew tenfold, and the issue of "contract labor" flared into prominence across the whole region. Apparently, relatively few of the new arrivals—who were now pre-empting most branches of common labor throughout industrial Pennsylvania—were actually imported from Europe under contractual arrangements with their prospective employers. But corporate power seemed so great and so menacing to American workers that they uniformly attributed a captive status to the new nationalities. Every time that employers brought a carload of eastern Europeans under armed guard from Pittsburgh or New York to work a struck mine (great numbers arrived this way during the bloody Hocking Valley strike of 1884), the impression seemed confirmed.\textsuperscript{27} This first workingmen's anti-foreign movement in the postwar era took form, therefore, as an attack on a supposedly servile class.

The mounting discontent of the early eighties stimulated the Knights of Labor, and as they spread swiftly from their early base in eastern Pennsylvania, the Knights carried far and wide the agitation against contract labor. In 1884 Powderley's supporters brought the question before Congress, where sympathetic legislators repeated the charge that monopolists were shipping from Hungary and Italy, "as so many cattle, large numbers of degraded, ignorant, brutal . . . foreign serfs" to replace American citizens.\textsuperscript{28} Both major parties and several small ones endorsed the Knights' plea for a ban on contract labor, while the Democrats blamed the Republicans for subjecting American workingmen to imported competition. The next year Congress fulfilled platform promises with a law forbidding anyone to prepay the transportation of an immigrant to the United States in return for a promise of his services. One Congressman asserted that exclusion of the small number of such cases would make no difference but that he would vote for the measure because of the universal labor demand for it. Two years later an administrative act brought into existence a new type of federal official, the contract labor inspector, who quizzed arriving immigrants on their plans for employment.\textsuperscript{29} To have a job before entering the country was becoming more reprehensible than to be unemployed afterward.

Although a good deal of unqualified anti-foreign sentiment was circulating among American workingmen by this time, the campaign against contract labor rested on a sharp distinction between voluntary immigration and that induced or controlled by capitalists. With remarkable unanimity, union leaders clung to this distinction through the late eighties and into the beginning of the next decade. Blaming their troubles either on contracts or on more subtle business techniques for stimulating immigration, the principal labor spokesmen refused to acknowledge that a normal, unencouraged, transatlantic movement harmed American workers. Powderley in 1888 insisted that few southeastern Europeans would come to the United States without employers' inducements. The organ of the Knights of Labor cursed "the stupendous folly of an industrial system which makes so naturally beneficent a thing as an increase of population a menace to the welfare of the wealth producers." Samuel Gompers, head of the rising American Federation of Labor, agreed that voluntary immigration was easily assimilated. The native-born editor of The Rights of Labor explicitly opposed any restrictions beyond the law of 1885, and as late as 1892 the president of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers told Congressmen: "We are not objecting to immigration that is voluntary."\textsuperscript{30} Organized labor was clearly reluctant to convert its vaguely class-conscious position into a thoroughly nativistic one. The unions played a surprisingly limited role, after the passage of the contract labor law, in initiating a broader restriction movement.

Two factors explain the unions' unwillingness to support a general limitation on immigration, the chief being their own ethnic composition. Partly because old-stock American workers tended to cherish an individualistic psychology, an extremely large pro-
portion of union members were themselves foreign-born. In Illinois, for example, four-fifths of the trade union membership in the eighties came from overseas, and everywhere Englishmen and Irishmen stood out as labor leaders. Along with its international background, much of organized labor had an international faith. The concept of the solidarity of workingmen in all countries was by no means an exclusively Marxist idea. In 1878 the Knights of Labor had resolved that "nothing should be said opposing any portion of humanity." Many trade unions incorporated the word "international" into their names. The early leaders of the A.F.L. adopted peculiarly American tactics but preserved an internationalist spirit. As long as labor leaders identified the new immigrants with contract labor, they evaded inner conflict, but outright opposition to immigration involved a fuller commitment to nationalism than they yet could make.

In point of fact the unions underwent less of a change of heart toward the immigrant than did their capitalistic adversaries. While labor leaders centered their fire on a special kind of immigration, business leaders were becoming broadly critical of the whole immigrant stream. They did not, of course, share the malice which some workingmen felt toward foreign-born competitors, but the revolution in their attitudes was greater and in terms of policy more significant. After leading the chorus of praise for immigration in the age of confidence, the businessman was now turning almost full circle. This shift, instead of bringing capital into some accord with labor, actually reflected the widening breach between them. Where one saw the foreigner as a tool of oppression, the other discerned an agent of unrest. The two lines of attack had little in common except their origin in a common situation: both reacted to the immigrant as a disruptive wedge in a dividing society.

Far from concentrating on the purely economic aspects of immigration, businessmen fretted about its consequences for social stability. The depression of the seventies had caused a few to ponder the danger of further additions to the army of jobless, and renewed unemployment in the mid-eighties heightened this concern. Each of the urban problems to which reformers pointed, from overpopulation to intemperance, multiplied business anxieties. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle worried because almost every "danger to the organization of society" originated among immigrants. Every disturbance of the social order, the journal warned, diminishes the courage and enterprise of capital.

The disturbances which particularly alarmed business opinion issued from the ranks of labor. By 1885 the mounting tempo of strikes and the sudden, furious growth of the Knights of Labor demonstrated to employers that a crisis indeed impended in the industrial world. Their reaction, on the whole, was unyielding and uncomprehending. American business found the whole tide of unrest baffling, except on the theory that foreign influence lay behind it. Two aspects of affairs impressed employers very forcibly: the prominence of foreigners both as leaders and as members of the unions; and the presence of proletarian radicals here and there among the immigrant throngs. Perhaps cheap foreign labor was proving exorbitantly expensive in its social costs.

The Slavic newcomers in Pennsylvania, supposedly the most docile of immigrants, soon provided a dramatic confirmation of businessmen's fears. Driven to desperation, several thousand Hungarian coke miners displayed a belligerence and solidarity that confounded the anticipations of unions and operators alike. In January 1886, a state law went into effect forbidding women to work in the mines. The immigrant coke workers, paid on piecework, had depended on their wives' assistance to eke out a living. When the coke syndicate, headed by Henry Clay Frick, refused to raise the rate of pay, the Hungarians threw down their tools. There were riots and arrests. The strike extended to native-born and northern European miners. The syndicate tried to intimidate the Hungarians by threatening to evict them from their company houses in the dead of winter; they replied that they would resist with their lives. Instead of risking a blood-bath, the syndicate resorted to another tactic—a general lockout. This too failed to daunt the strikers, and in the end they won a small advance.

These events provoked the organ of Pittsburgh's industrialists to indignant reflections on "furious Huns" and their lack of sympathy with American institutions. The journal concluded that immigration was hastening the social ills of overcrowded Europe. The American Iron and Steel Association spoke for restriction more bluntly: "It is impossible to deal intelligently and thoroughly with the labor question without dealing with the immigration question."
CRISIS IN THE EIGHTIES

By this time the anti-immigrant trend in business circles was well advanced. A survey of the opinions of 795 employers in Wisconsin—mostly with medium-size or small businesses—showed a big majority in favor of restriction, the proportion hostile to immigration being much larger than that in the somewhat similar poll of workingmen's attitudes taken a year later. And in 1888 the National Board of Trade, forerunner of the United States Chamber of Commerce, for the first time came out for protection against "the scourings of foreign disease, pauperism and crime." 25

The change in business opinion, remarkable as it was, did not come without misgivings and qualifications. Like the unions, the corporations could not in a single decade wholly sever the ties that bound them to the immigrants. Some businessmen remained complacent, continuing to celebrate the economic value of immigration, the operation of the law of supply and demand in regulating it, and the power of a homogeneous society to assimilate it. More commonly, business spokesmen reacted against immigration without reaching specific conclusions on how to cope with the problem. Caught between growing trepidations and a lingering appreciation of the immigrant's usefulness, employers often sounded querulous, uncertain, unready to espouse a definite line of action.46

Above all, neither industrialists nor labor chieftains were in the full sense of the word nativist. Neither displayed much of a quality essential to a thoroughgoing xenophobia: an aroused and defensive nationalism. They approached immigration problems primarily in the guise of interested parties, and though their concern embraced the whole structure and future of American society, they indulged very little in florid appeals to national loyalty or survival. It was a short step from concrete anxieties about the social order to vaster beliefs that the nation itself stood in peril, but neither of the organized interests most directly affected by immigration blazed the way.

Beginning of Hysteria

Yet elsewhere in public opinion it was perhaps inevitable that the disturbing implications of the social problems heading up in the 1880's should awaken a strident nationalism. Nationalism has func-

tioned as the most powerful unifying force in modern society, and its intensity has increased enormously in times of serious disruptive pressures. The fiery nationalisms of the fifties grew out of sectional cleavage; by the same centripetal principle, class cleavage could hardly fail in the eighties to produce a resurgence of nationalism. In both cases a baffled need for unity asserted itself in nativistic aggression.

Perhaps this explanation of the function of the new nationalist ferment may also help to locate its most active sources. At least it is suggestive that the pioneers of the nativist revival were not the appointed representatives of militant labor or the conscious spokesmen of adamant capital—not men securely attached to the congealing power groups that were straining the social fabric. Instead, a full-blown xenophobia dawned diffusely in the amorphous, urban and semi-urban public which lay in between. May not the very "in-betweens" of petty businessmen, nonunionized workers, and white-collar folk have left them easy victims of demoralization? In a conservative era that was unable to ignore yet unwilling to face up to its inner schisms, the rootless "in-betweens" had few resources to resist the loss of homogeneity. But they knew, at least, that they belonged to the nation and it to them. They could understand the discord in their Eden, and combat it, as an alien intrusion.

The sense of danger pressing on reformers, business leaders, and organized labor burst forth before this larger public about 1886, when an unprecedented eruption of strikes and mass boycotts opened an era of massive and recurrent discontent. Nativism, as a significant force in modern America, dates from that labor upheaval. At a time when monopoly and plutocracy cast darkening shadows over the summits of American society and when opportunity to escape westward seemed to be diminishing, unrest in the depths took on redoubled meaning. Each of the historic traditions of American nativism—submerged for a generation—came to life. Among the three fears, of European radicals, European religion, and European races, the last enjoyed the smallest vogue. Still the stepchild among American nativisms, the Anglo-Saxon tradition evolved within an intellectual elite whose separate story belongs in a later chapter. Anti-radical and anti-Catholic ideas were already
integrated into American popular culture; they contain the essence of the nativist revival. And since a labor convulsion precipitated that revival, anti-radical nationalism was initially its most suitable vehicle.

The belief that revolutionary immigrants imported the seeds of labor unrest had already proved relevant to industrial America in the 1870's. The new swell of discontent seemed to confirm the worst suspicions of 1877. If one needed objective evidence that the tumult was foreign-inspired, the prominence of immigrants in the labor movement gave specious credibility to the charge. Furthermore, a tiny group of noisy anarchists, almost all of them immigrants, was becoming more active. In Chicago, almost the only place where the anarchist movement showed vitality, English- and German-language newspapers gleefully instructed readers on how to manufacture dynamite.41

There the event that catalyzed nationalistic fears of immigrant radicalism occurred. Industrial discontent was reaching its height in May 1886, culminating in a loose attempt at a nation-wide general strike for an eight-hour day. In the thick of the "eight-hour" strikes, the Chicago anarchists called a meeting in Haymarket Square. Nervous police closed in on the peaceful throng, a bomb exploded in their midst. In itself, the occurrence was slight compared to the railroad violence of 1877. But because of the doubts and anxieties of the decade following, the Haymarket Affair was to go down as the most important single incident in late nineteenth century nativism.

Instantly, a torrent of nationalist hysteria coursed through the cities of the Northeast and Midwest. Unable to discover the bomb-thrower's identity, Chicago authorities nevertheless sentenced six immigrants (five of them German) and one native American to death, and another German to a long prison term. In the big daily newspapers the stereotype of the immigrant glowed bright red, restriction sentiment suddenly coalesced, and editorial writers brayed:

The enemy forces are not American [but] rag-tag and bob-tail cutthroats of Beelzebub from the Rhine, the Danube, the Vistula and the Elbe.

These people are not Americans, but the very scum and offal of Europe.

... an invasion of venomous reptiles.

... long-haired, wild-eyed, bad-smelling, atheistic, reckless foreign wretches, who never did an honest hour's work in their lives ... crush such snakes ... before they have time to bite.

There is no such thing as an American anarchist. ... The American character has in it no element which can under any circumstances be won to uses so mistaken and pernicious ... a firm stand in favor of the right of Americans to govern America.

... a danger that threatens the destruction of our national edifice by the erosion of its moral foundations.

... Europe's human and inhuman rubbish.

Our National existence, and, as well, our National and social institutions are at stake.42

For years the memory of Haymarket and the dread of imported anarchy haunted the American consciousness. No nativist image prevailed more widely than that of the immigrant as a lawless creature, given over to violence and disorder. Ripples spread out from Haymarket in a dozen directions, mingling more and more subtly with almost every current of xenophobia. Nativistic reformers joined in denouncing the immigrant as an author of revolution as well as an agent of reaction; and for the wide public which associated Haymarket with labor militancy, the stain of foreign turbulence tainted the entire labor movement.43 Of course the unions on the whole repudiated the charge and kept their own limited attack on immigration free from nationalist themes. Only the most bourgeois of unions reflected the nativist spirit—a fact which tells something of its basis and appeal. The Order of Railway Conductors was exceptional both for its horror of strikes and for its unabashed, anti-radical nativism. After Haymarket, the order insisted that lawless foreigners were behind most of the current "labor troubles" and that complete suspension of immigration might be necessary to keep the United States from becoming a for-
eign nation. At the same time the Railway Conductors stood for a partnership of labor and capital “working side by side for the permanent advantage of all our honest business ventures in this boasted land of equality.”

Most concretely, nativist agitation manifested itself through the rebirth in the late eighties of an organized movement. Little nativist societies sprang to life, attracting lower-middle-class and working people to the search for unity through national conflict. At first some of them organized politically on the pattern of the prewar Know-Nothing. Three weeks after the Haymarket Affair, Peter D. Wigginton, a railroad attorney in California, founded the American party, declaring that the time had come for the American people to take full charge of their government “to the exclusion of the restless revolutionary horde of foreigners who are now seeking our shores from every part of the world.” This single-purpose party, while failing miserably to achieve national significance, made an impression for a time on politics in the San Francisco area. It found recruits chiefly among young workingmen and white-collar employees. It posed as “the real law and order party,” contending that foreigners incited all strikes, riots, and disorders. Indeed, it regarded the strike as a foreign importation. In the same breath, the party denounced organized capital: “Thirty years ago the wealth of the nation was largely distributed among the masses; to-day it is largely owned or controlled by comparatively few men. Class legislation, monopolies, syndicates, rings . . . are written with an iron hand in the history of this increase of millionaires.”

By the 1880’s the two-party system had become too deeply entrenched for a distinctively nativist party to repeat even the brief success of the Know-Nothing. Furthermore, a separate trial of strength had little attraction when the Republicans were showing signs of interest in the immigration issue. In 1887 Republican conventions in Pennsylvania and Ohio came out for immigration restriction. The Republican Senator, Justin Morrill, a veteran nationalist in matters of tariffs and education, introduced a bill for general restriction. The next year the California Republican convention spoke its alarm over an increasing influx of foreign radicals. Aside from the short-lived American party, therefore, nativistic associations took the form of “patriotic” societies, operating as pressure groups within the existing party structure.

The most powerful patriotic society of the day was an aggregation of Civil War veterans, the Grand Army of the Republic, then climbing toward its peak membership of some four hundred thousand. G.A.R. spokesmen, already long practiced in nationalist attacks on the South, began in the late eighties to splutter over the immigration of foreign radicals, who were allying with “copperheads and ex-rebels, for venomous warfare against the soldiers.”

The societies which cultivated the anti-radical tradition most insistently, however, were three secret fraternal organizations whose roots went back to the earlier nativist ferment of the 1840’s: the Order of United American Mechanics, the Junior Order United American Mechanics, and the Patriotic Order Sons of America. They had started among American workingmen exercised over immigrant competition, but by the eighties they were soliciting members from all walks of life and actually attracting, along with skilled workers, such people as clergymen, small merchants, and minor public functionaries. They admitted only native whites and required “that in all business transactions we shall remember our own nationality.” The secret of their feeble survival through the age of confidence lay not so much, however, in an anti-foreign appeal as in the insurance benefits which they provided for their small memberships. Each maintained a fund to aid members in times of sickness, death, or other distress.

A new vigor enlivened the three orders in the late eighties. The Order of United American Mechanics, the only one of the three with a continuous existence through the Civil War period, established in 1887 a quasi-military rank, the Loyal Legion, which brought the organization before the public eye by parading. The Junior Order United American Mechanics, an offspring of the O.U.A.M., dissolved all ties with the parent society in 1885 and grew from fifteen thousand members at the end of that year to sixty thousand in 1889. Its strength centered in Pennsylvania, where all three groups had been founded. The Patriotic Order Sons of America, a postwar revival of the older Sons of America, entered a comparable period of expansion, its star-studded, red-white-and-blue regalia spreading widely through the North, Midwest, and California. It established a feminine auxiliary, the Patri-
otic Daughters of America (1887), and in 1887 it had the most successful year in its history.41

The fraternal orders all espoused an identical program. Their buckshot attacks on immigrants hit particularly at “Anarchists and all that class of heartless and revolutionary agitators” who come “to terrorize the community and to exalt the red flag of the commune above the Stars and Stripes.” 42 At the same time, the orders felt wider anxieties and urged a nationalist solution to social problems. Only organized patriotism, they said, can save the country from foreigners interested in nothing but “the almighty dollar.” Yet patriotism, they sometimes confessed, was suffering in America—suffering from the selfishness of plutocratic capitalists and striking workers. Perhaps avarice on both sides heralds an approaching war between labor and capital in which “the victory will be with the man from over the sea.”43

While raging at imported discontent, the fraternal orders played on a second anti-foreign theme. They were anti-Catholic as well as anti-radical, though they usually put the radical issue ahead of the religious one. To another group of nativists, fewer perhaps in numbers but swayed by a matchless fury, the Catholic peril loomed largest. For all the differences between the two traditions of exclusive nationalism, the crisis of the eighties revitalized both, and in many minds they overlapped. One nativist, for example, declared: “Two lines of foreign influence are now at work among us, both of which are fraught with evil portent to our Republic; one tends toward license, agrarianism, anarchy; the other tends toward superstition, ultramontanism, tyranny: both by different roads to one ultimate end, despotism.”44

The social-economic tensions which activated the anti-radical movement had much to do with its anti-Catholic counterpart also. The sharpest manifestations of anti-Catholic nationalism occurred in the same “in-between” strata which fed the American party and the nativist fraternal orders, and religious xenophobes sometimes evinced the same social anxieties. Occasionally the fear of class war was straightforwardly confessed: in discussing the growth of an arrogant plutocracy and increasing envy among the idle poor, an anti-Catholic journal in 1889 predicted a revolution “unless the vast middling-class will educate the two extremes, check the power of the very rich and elevate the extreme poor.” More often, anti-

Catholics imputed the antagonism between capital and labor to Romanist labor leaders, whom they charged with fomenting discontent under priestly instigation.45

Along with this common basis in class cleavage, however, Protestant nativism had its own specific roots in religious conflict. The religious factor lit the anti-Catholic movement with the flame of fanaticism. “I believe fully,” wrote one zealot, “that the Protestant will win, as God is on our side, and . . . it will be a victory, tho’ many a brave warrior may bite the dust . . . . I wish I could with the brave cohorts of Jesus lead on to conquer, or under his bloodstained banner die. . . . Twere a death most gladly to be hailed.”46 Anti-Catholic nativism might have amounted to little if, on top of the general crisis of the eighties, a crisis in Protestant-Catholic relations had not supervened.

On the whole the Catholic hierarchy, under the temperate leadership of Cardinal Gibbons, followed a less militant policy than it had in the early seventies; but some Catholic educators in the late eighties renewed pleas for state aid. In the special field of Indian schools, successful lobbying by the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions reversed the original distribution of federal funds to church-operated reservation schools, so that by the end of the decade Catholics were receiving a disproportionately large, rather than a disproportionately small, share of federal appropriations for Indian education. More important than these peripheral claims, however, was the tumultuous institutional growth of Catholicism itself. The years immediately following the Third Plenary Council in 1884 witnessed a spectacular expansion in dioceses and especially in parochial schools. At the council’s bidding, each parish strove to build a school, and Catholic parents felt increased pressure to send their children there.47 At the same time non-Catholics were becoming increasingly insistent on a standard, compulsory system of education dominated by the secular state. A sweeping attempt to establish public regulation of parochial schools convulsed Massachusetts from 1887 to 1889. Concurrently Ohio imposed attendance requirements on all schools, and Illinois and Wisconsin (where some Lutheran and Catholic schools used German as the language of instruction) hotly debated legislation requiring all children to be taught in English.48

To great numbers of Americans the common school was becam-
of the preceding decade was its inclusion of the immigrant along with the priest as an object of attack. In an age relatively untroubled with social problems, anti-Catholics had tended to restrict their ire to the Roman hierarchy. Now they denounced immigration as a complementary national problem. Typically they trembled at the Roman challenge to American freedom, rallied to the defense of the public school system, and urged limitations on immigration and naturalization.

A whole crop of secret, anti-Catholic societies sprang up, none of more than local consequence but scattered in many localities. Regardless of actual size, they usually aspired to become a dominant force in American politics. It is noteworthy that one of the earliest of the new groups arose in Chicago in 1886. Named at first the United Order of Deputies and later the American League, it attracted ten or fifteen thousand from the lower-middle and working classes; it demanded that employers discharge all Romanists, but never realized its grandiose political ambitions. In the same year a New York political adventurer formed the Minute Men of 1886, campaigning for the public school system and against immigration. The next four years saw the appearance of the Red, White and Blue (a super-secret little group formed by an impecunious bookseller to meet the perils described in Josiah Strong's Our Country), the United Order of Native Americans, the American Patriotic League, the Get There American Benefit Association, and the Loyal Men of American Liberty.

Some of these groups worked in friendly cooperation with and recruited members from pre-existing anti-Catholic societies organized by British immigrants. Few Americans hated the Catholic Irish more than did the Protestant Irish. They had composed most of the membership of the American Protestant Association ever since its formation in the 1850's, and about 1870 they transplanted the more bellicose, Loyal Orange Institution from Great Britain. To these fraternal orders was added the politically conscious British-American Association in 1887. "It is the honor of the Anglo-American and British-American organizations," declared a nativist journal, "that they are the only foreign-born element that can be regarded in any sense as an organized part of this movement." The fact that the foreign societies gave less attention than the native ones to immigration restriction did not stand in the way
of an entente between the two types, though the native-born groups sometimes fretted that their allies could not become "whole-hearted Americans." 66

The organization which ultimately developed real power wrapped itself in the deepest secrecy in the eighties and did not, therefore, become generally known. The American Protective Association was born in 1887 in Clinton, Iowa, a railroad junction on the banks of the Mississippi that claimed to be the largest manufacturing center in the state. The A.P.A. came out of the fevered imagination of Henry F. Bowers, who directed it for six years. Bowers, a deeply pious, slightly paranoid, middle-aged widower, saw Catholic conspiracies everywhere. A self-taught lawyer, he blamed his own educational deficiencies on a subversive Jesuit conspiracy against the public schools of Baltimore during his youth. Consequently he had the school question uppermost in mind. 66

The immediate circumstances from which the order arose were, however, political and social; its origin reflected in miniature the general crisis of the eighties. Bowers was a close associate and adviser of Clinton's mayor, Arnold Walliker, who had come into office with the combined support of local businessmen and the Knights of Labor. Walliker soon alienated the biggest corporation in town and also lost the backing of the Knights. His defeat for re-election in 1887 was due chiefly to the Irish mill workers who comprised a large part of the union's strength in Clinton. Convinced that Catholic influence had undone Walliker, Bowers and he organized the A.P.A. within a week after the election. The small group that met in Bowers' office to found the secret order included several businessmen and dissident members of the Knights of Labor who shared a bitter determination to thwart the growing power of Romanism in local politics and labor. 67

Bowers' fanaticism gave the A.P.A. its initial impetus, and the social tensions of the day provided recruits. He traveled widely through Iowa and into adjacent states, lecturing publicly on the Roman peril and secretly founding A.P.A. councils. Every recruit took an oath never to vote for a Catholic, never to employ one when a Protestant was available, and never to go out on strike with Catholics. Much of this early support came from disaffected union members, especially from the Knights of Labor, which was falling apart due to the anti-labor reaction after the Haymarket

Affair. In some places Bowers drew mostly from railroad trainmen, switchmen, and clerks, who felt dissatisfied with unions and threatened with Irish competition. By 1890, when the National Council of the A.P.A. convened for the first time in Chicago rather than in Iowa, its local councils were flourishing in communities scattered from Detroit to Omaha. 68

Limits of the New Nativism

For the A.P.A., and also for the whole modern nativist movement, the 1880's were formative years; they brought nothing to fruition. As an organized force, xenophobia remained fragmentary. As a legislative program, it achieved nothing beyond the contract labor law. Even as a point of view, it was incomplete. Long-submerged fears of European threats to American freedom had, to be sure, reawakened, but the sense of danger had only begun to press against America's cosmopolitan traditions. Confidence in the process of assimilation and in the resulting fusion of a superior nationality was still widespread. For all of the talk of foreign dangers, hardly anyone denied the ultimate success of assimilation. The most advanced restrictionists still boasted of America's absorptive powers, contending only that the process was becoming too slow for safety. Significantly, the pro-restrictionist Philadelphia Press commented in 1888: "The strong stomach of American civilization may, and doubtless will, digest and assimilate ultimately this unsavory and repellent throng. . . . In time they catch the spirit of the country and form an element of decided worth." 69

The old pride in America as a home of the oppressed survived more feebly than the melting-pot idea. The concept of an American haven for people discontented with their own governments exerted little fascination for an age that feared revolution. But though the idea was not often invoked, it was rarely repudiated. The grand dedication ceremonies for the Statue of Liberty in October 1886 passed off without a single reference to the poetic welcome that Emma Lazarus had penned three years before to "huddled masses yearning to breathe free." Orators expatiated far more on liberty radiating outward into the world than on oppression seeking refuge here. 70

Along with the force of inherited beliefs, other factors curbed
the fledgling nativism of the eighties. Xenophobia had geographical as well as intellectual limits. Despite some western concern over a diminishing land supply, anti-foreign and anti-Catholic sentiment thrived chiefly in the urban areas of the Northeast and the older Middle West. Newspapers west of the Mississippi and south of the Mason and Dixon Line still favored immigration, in contrast to the critical tone developing in the press of more thickly settled areas. In the South, particularly, the dominant groups clamored for a larger white population and met no opposition in doing so. Although few immigrants actually materialized, the “New South” clung through the 1880's to the business dream of industrial progress and population growth. Likewise, the Catholic issue failed to arouse interest there. Accordingly, none of the nativist societies penetrated south of Virginia. A member of the Order of United American Mechanics tried to establish a council in Florida but had to disband it. Those who joined soon lost interest, while outsiders considered the order dangerously akin to a labor union. The immigrants were urban people, their church was an urban institution, and the initial attacks on them were related to problems that centered in the cities of the North.

A final limitation remains to be mentioned. The authentic nativism of the eighties contained no assertion of—much less any emphasis upon—a broad, fundamental distinction between immigrant types. In its anti-immigrant aspect, the hatred struck at foreigners indiscriminately. Particular targets, such as German anarchists, Irish Catholics, and Slavic contract labor, might receive the brunt of the attack, but in each case the xenophobe interpreted his particular enemy as symbolic of a generalized foreign danger. He made no effort to select any part of the immigrant stream as the bearer of all of its vice. The point is important, for historians have usually traced the beginnings of modern nativism to a shift in the sources of immigration, a shift from an “old immigration” of northwestern Europeans to a “new immigration” from southern and eastern Europe. A turn in the immigrant tide was indeed under way in the eighties, but later observers saw it more clearly and took it more seriously than anyone could at the time. Nobody yet understood that a deep and permanent change in the whole course of immigration was under way. As late as 1891 journalists dismissed “the increase from undesirable sources” as a temporary phenomenon.  

Although the differences between “old” and “new” immigrants were much less sharp and the shift occurred much less abruptly than twentieth century nativists have taught us to believe, those abstractions do summarize a significant transition. In the late nineteenth century the impulse to emigrate reached progressively deeper into Europe, uprooting more and more remote peoples. The Slavic and Italian influx to Pennsylvania began in the seventies, and by 1880 the Great Lakes region also had substantial clusters of Poles, while New York’s Lower East Side contained crowded districts of Italians and Russo-Polish Jews. That year saw a sudden jump in immigration from Italy and Hungary; in the next, pogroms hurried a mass exodus of Jews from the Russian Empire. Throughout the eighties, Italian, Slavic, and Yiddish immigration increased. The peasants from these lands beyond the Alps lived much closer to serfdom than did the folk of western Europe, who were still pouring into the United States in diminished numbers; and the eastern European Jews were seeing a world outside of the ghetto for the first time. By western European standards, the masses of southern and eastern Europe were educationally deficient, socially backward, and bizarre in appearance.

Long before the coming of the new immigration, the common people of eastern Europe had excited in Americans a simple, ethnocentric repugnance which marked the great social distance between them. The few Americans who had any firsthand contact with the eastern European masses in the early and mid-nineteenth century often judged them more personally distasteful than the immigrant groups which were presenting an immediate issue. An old-fashioned New York gentleman in the 1830's burst out: “A dirty Irishman is bad enough, but he’s nothing comparable to a nasty . . . Italian loafer.” American travelers in Europe felt a similar contempt. “The lowest Irish are far above the level of these creatures,” John Fiske observed in Italy. Even Emerson had been thankful that immigration brought “the light complexion, the blue eyes of Europe,” that “the black eyes, the black drop, the Europe of Europe, is left.” And in the early seventies, at the peak of America’s receptiveness to immigrants, native settlers refused to
move into the same vicinity with a Polish colony in Illinois, the land nearby long remaining vacant.  

That the arrival of the new immigrants in large numbers would generate instant dislike was, therefore, only to be expected. But the initial hostility they suffered consisted almost wholly of the conventional reaction against their culture and appearance. Except perhaps where they were caught up in domestic tensions such as those in the Pennsylvania coal fields, the southern and eastern Europeans did not at first seem a distinctive threat to national unity or survival. Thus the criticism of the Italians and of the Jews—the groups which fared worst in most places—fastened on stereotyped traits, not on imputations of subversive activity or total unassimilability.

The Italians were often thought to be the most degraded of the European newcomers. They were swarthy, more than half of them were illiterate, and almost all were victims of a standard of living lower than that of any of the other prominent nationalities. They were the ragpickers and the poorest of common laborers; in one large city their earnings averaged 40 per cent less than those of the general slum-dweller.  

Wherever they went, a distinctive sobriquet followed them. "You don't call... an Italian a white man?" a West Coast construction boss was asked. "No, sir," he answered, "an Italian is a Dago."  

Also, they soon acquired a reputation as bloodthirsty criminals. Since southern Italians had never learnt to fight with their fists, knives flashed when they brawled among themselves or jostled with other immigrants. Soon a penologist was wondering how the country could build prisons which Italians would not prefer to their own slum quarters. On the typical Italian the prison expert commented: "The knife with which he cuts his bread he also uses to lop off another 'dago's' finger or ear... He is quite as familiar with the sight of human blood as with the sight of the food he eats."

The reception of eastern European Jews in the few great cities where they first settled was hardly less adverse. Almost as strange to the German Jews who had preceded them as to the native Americans, these impoverished, undernourished refugees wore long black coats and untamed beards, practiced a distinctive religious ritual, and spoke their own language—Yiddish—with vivid gesticulations. Doubtless they were dirty; such at least was the initial and con-

 temptuous image their presence inspired. The New York Tribune in 1882 noted blandly: "Numerous complaints have been made in regard to the Hebrew immigrants who lounge about Battery Park, obstructing the walks and sitting on the chairs. Their filthy condition has caused many of the people who are accustomed to go to the park to seek a little recreation and fresh air to give up this practice. The immigrants also greatly annoy the persons who cross the park to take the boats to Coney Island, Staten Island and Brooklyn. The police have had many battles with these newcomers, who seem determined to have their own way." To this first impression unfriendly observers soon added the traditional Shylock stereotype. Many of the Jewish immigrants started out in America with a peddler's pack. Since the railroads and the mail order houses had deprived peddlers of a useful function as rural distributors, however, they competed raucously in the city streets. Here, to many Americans, was the very personification of avarice and cunning. "Money is their God," wrote Jacob Ris of the Russian Jews as a whole.

Painful though these epithets were, they failed to touch the springs of nationalism. Nativists in the eighties almost wholly ignored the rising new immigration. The points of departure for modern American nativism lay not in external stimuli but in internal conditions, not in new peoples or ideas but in new problems reacting upon the recessive traditions of American nationalism. The problems, to be sure, were not completely novel. They included such recurrent issues as religious conflict and economic competition, but these functioned within a larger context both startling and unfamiliar. For the first time in American history (with the partial exception of the Federalist era) a sizeable section of opinion made the momentous and troubling discovery that the United States confronted the social ills of the Old World.
Chapter Four

The Nationalist Nineties

Still I think that . . . the one last surviving popular ideal of patriotism will save us from tumbling to pieces this time.
—Henry Adams, 1896

The crisis of the eighties passed imperceptibly into the deeper strain and anguish of the nineties. No clear division separated the two decades, either in the history of nativism or in the general course of American civilization. The period from about 1885 to 1897 was one of recurring calamities and almost unrelied discontent, culminating in the savage depression of 1893-1897. In the industrial North and in the farming regions west and south of it, masses of Americans groped to escape the dominance of an uncompromising plutocracy—and groped in vain. Meanwhile, fear of the stranger accumulated on all sides, mounting into hatred, bursting into violence, and intruding into politics. Nativist movements occupied a significant place among the rising currents of national feeling that swept the decade. None of these chauvinistic enthusiasms quite overcame America’s optimistic and cosmopolitan heritage, just as the underlying fears of a closed society were never fully realized. But the unsolved problems of an industrial, urban culture grew steadily more vexing; and the nativist response became more general, more insistent, and more explicitly nationalist.

Unrest in an Age of Depression

Industrial warfare sputtered on during the early and mid-nineties, as rebellious employees continued to clash with unyielding employers. The governors of at least five states called out National Guard units in the summer of 1892 on occasions of industrial violence, and at Homestead, Pennsylvania, steel workers fought head on with an army of private detectives. Two years later, during another crescendo of discontent, the tremendous Pullman strike unleashed idle mobs in the Chicago railroad yards and brought United States courts and soldiers into the battle on the company side. The spirit of rebellion was abroad in rural America too; southern and western farmers were defying the reigning economic orthodoxies and the existing party structure alike in the angriest political crusade of their lives. Their determination to redeem from government what seemed lost to monopoly heightened year by year, leading through Populism into Bryanism and the election of 1896. Privileged groups resisted every challenge as doggedly as the federal government clung to a gold standard, but the protests could no more be stopped than could the steady drain on the Treasury’s gold reserve.

If public finances were bad, private ones were often worse. A wave of business failures in 1893 ushered in four years of depression. Soon, millions were out of work, many to become tramps, some to collect in little bands marching on Washington as “petitioners on boots.” This national economic breakdown may not, in itself, have wrought more suffering than the depression of the seventies, but it came at a more anxious moment and afflicted a society less confident of its general state of health. The “panic of ’93” gave an important impetus to nativism because it climaxed several years of baffled discontent.

In pondering the practical issue of immigration restriction, both capital and organized labor moved gradually and steadily in the anti-foreign direction they had begun to take during the preceding decade. The conditions that engendered mutual hostility between employers and unionists subjected to mounting strain the ties that linked them to the immigrants. Evidence of foreign participation in strikes continued to work on business opinion. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle felt a new zeal for restriction after a Russian-born anarchist tried to kill Henry Clay Frick, Pittsburgh industrialist, in 1892. The same year the National Board of Trade, prompted by its Chicago and New York affiliates, came out overwhelmingly for a plan to admit only immigrants passing an inspec-
tion by American consuls overseas. Thus some of the confusion in business thinking was becoming resolved, even before the panic, in favor of a moderate degree of restriction. On the other hand, many business leaders hesitated before decisive action, fearful of complicating production problems in an effort to solve social problems. The New York Journal of Commerce held defiantly to the traditional position, arguing for free immigration on the ground that men, like cows, are expensive to raise and a gift of either should be gladly received. “A man,” the paper added, “can be put to more valuable use than a cow.”

The long downward plunge of the depression stopped this line of argument. The happy pastime of calculating the dollar value of each new arrival passed into neglect. Instead, businessmen reflected on how unemployed aliens burdened the community and enlarged the stagnant pool of unused manpower. Seen in a context of hunger and want, the newcomer appeared more than ever a danger to society. In 1894 the National Board of Trade deliberated, though it did not adopt, a new and advanced proposal to restrict immigration by a test of literacy. Other groups did take a determined stand. Arguing for thoroughgoing restriction, the general manager of the American Iron and Steel Association maintained that the depression was greatly aggravated by “the presence among us of thousands of idle and vicious foreigners who have not come here to work for a living but to stir up strife and to commit crime.” These sentiments became sufficiently popular by the mid-nineties to win support for a strict literacy test of immigration from a number of business organizations: the Boston Merchants Association, the Boston Chamber of Commerce, the Seattle Chamber of Commerce, The Chicago Board of Trade, and the Commercial Travellers of the United States.

Like the economic ties binding industrialists to immigrants, the ethnic and idealistic bonds between American- and European-born workers were weakening. The distinction between voluntary and induced immigration, which organized labor cultivated so assiduously through the eighties, was now wearing thin. As the new immigration continued to expand in the early nineties, the unions had to face the fact that this was no mere conspiracy on the part of employers. Organized labor confronted a clear choice between national and international loyalties. Painfully, it adjusted itself to nationalism.

The declining Knights of Labor, which was fast losing its character as a workers’ movement, came out for a general restriction of immigration in 1892. At Powderly’s warning that American liberty was slipping away, the Knights proposed the exclusion of all immigrants who lacked sufficient resources to support themselves for a year after landing.

The American Federation of Labor and its member unions yielded less easily. They still had great numbers of foreign-born members and strong international sympathies. A.F.L. President Samuel Gompers was well in advance of the rank and file. This rough-hewn, pugnacious man was himself a Jewish immigrant boy from England, and he had risen to labor leadership through a New York industry—cigar-making—which was exposed to wave after wave of immigrants. Around 1890, when Gompers was first adopting a restrictionist position, cigar-making was receiving a new influx of immigrant labor, a flood of Russian Jews. This was a group whose arrival many older Jewish immigrants feared and resented. Gompers brought the immigration issue before the A.F.L. convention in 1891 with a plea for “relief from this pressing evil.” The convention replied that further restriction was unnecessary. Only after 1893 did nativist agitation become widespread among the unions; then three more years passed before it bore much fruit.

With the coming of the depression, want embittered all of the unsatisfied resentments of preceding years. Now labor papers teemed with discussion of immigration, and editors strove to convince their members of its danger. John Swinton, a prominent labor editor, put the case with crystal clearness: the supply of labor has far outstripped the demand, immigrants add to the crowds of unemployed in the cities, capitalists exploit the situation by hiring workers on their own terms, and there is no escape to the West now that the “free lands of other years are fenced in.” Other labor spokesmen branded cosmopolitan ideas as sentimental and erected self-preservation as a patriotic alternative: “We sympathize with the oppressed of the Old World, but we . . . are as a country . . . in the position of any other asylum whose dormitories are full up . . . . The American movement is strictly American. . . . We cannot go abroad and hope to lift up the labor of
the world. . . . The selfishness that provides for the home and protection of the family from want or danger is the only spirit in which this question may be considered successfully."

Foreign-born and internationalist workers replied by appealing to the brotherhood of man and by blaming the capitalists rather than the immigrants for labor's troubles. The Boston Central Labor Union thought it detected a revival of the principle of the Fugitive Slave Laws in immigration restriction. This opposition prevented action at the AFL conventions in 1894 and 1896, but the next year restrictionists finally secured official endorsement of the literacy test. By then several other labor organizations had already done so—no great number. A few unions were also beginning to exclude from membership aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens. Organized labor moved with the nativist tide in the nineties, but certainly not in advance of it, or with full assurance.

While the leading interest groups concerned with immigration struggled to define their point of view, nativist tendencies functioned much more powerfully beyond their ranks. Even the workingman's economic jealousy had free play outside of the confines of official union policy. The fear of job competition from foreigners contributed to a host of incidents and movements; most tangibly, it appeared in restrictions on employment. Under the pressure of intense and prolonged unemployment, several state legislatures went far beyond the pinprick discriminations of the previous decade. In 1894 and 1895 New York and Pennsylvania excluded all aliens (not just those who had not yet declared their intention to become citizens) from jobs on state and local public works. Since immigrants traditionally did most of the common labor in the North, the new laws threatened to close a large opportunity to them. Idaho, where mining was suffering from the slump, also prohibited private corporations from hiring aliens who had not declared their intention to become citizens.

Economic discrimination reached a peak in two Pennsylvania statutes sponsored by coal miners in 1897. One set up residence and language requirements for certification as a miner. The other required employers to deduct a special state tax from the wages of all alien laborers. This levy on the most poorly paid and underprivileged group in the state—"a vicious species of class legisla-

"tion" in the words of the highest Pennsylvania court—did not survive a legal test. In general the courts in the late nineteenth century took an old-fashioned view of the civil rights of aliens and held such statutes contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Their enactment, however, reveals vividly the impact of depression on nativism.

Yet, discriminatory legislation was far from common, and fear of direct economic competition from immigrants must have affected only limited groups and regions. A depression environment exacerbated anti-foreign sentiment in much broader, though less obvious, ways. In accounting for the main trends of xenophobia in the nineties one can never wholly separate the economic collapse from the social turmoil that accompanied it.

One of the outstanding nativist consequences of this combined social and economic breakdown was a nation-wide extension of the attack on immigration. Before the blighted nineties, anti-immigrant agitation had made little headway outside of the industrial North. Although the issue of land monopoly had already provoked some xenophobia in the South and in the trans-Mississippi West, it was scattered and sporadic. The Northeast and Old Northwest still remained the centers of nativism, but the fever now spread throughout the land, infecting all sections and every class.

The farmers' economic status deteriorated rapidly from 1890 on, and in the accumulating agrarian protest movements a distrust of foreign influence grew more marked. But until the depression, important western newspapers welcomed European settlers and denounced the restrictionist clamor in the East. The South was wedded still more firmly to the traditional business gospel of immigration as a key to material development. Southern Congressmen put up the only vigorous opposition to a mild strengthening of immigration laws in 1891. As late as the spring of 1893, an official British investigator concluded that stringent immigration restriction was unlikely in the United States because of the resistance of the South and West.

Just at that time, however, nativism was becoming nation-wide under the pressure of nation-wide distress. In the West conservative and radical spokesmen alike cried out against a European invasion. Three legislatures petitioned Congress to check it. Indiscriminate immigration, said Wyoming, "now threatens to over-
whelm this nation.” It “threaten[s] the perpetuity of our institutions,” echoed California. The state of Washington wanted Congress to prohibit all immigration for ten years. In several northwestern states, societies to promote immigration maintained a feeble existence but endorsed the principle of restriction. When a showdown came in Congress in 1896-97, the area west of the Missouri River voted almost unanimously for general immigration restriction.

Xenophobia rapidly gained ground in the South as well. The most various types—businessmen, lawyers, educators, Populists—raised their voices against “this mass of European corruption.” By 1896, a good majority of southern Senators and Representatives had swung over to restriction. On the other hand, the South, the section with the fewest immigrants, still had the greatest lust for them. Regional and state immigration associations, though much less active than in earlier years, continued to meet at the behest of the railroads and their political and economic allies. And in Congress every other part of the country cast a heavier vote for restriction. On one key vote in the House of Representatives the pro-restrictionist majority of 193 included thirty-nine southerners, but of the thirty-seven Congressmen who voted against restriction, twenty-four came from the South as against seven from the Mid-Atlantic states, three from the Midwest, two from New England, and one from the trans-Missouri West. Thus the economic tempests of the nineties swept West and South into nativist ranks but left a powerful opposition still entrenched in the latter.

Aside from this expansion of appeal, perhaps the commonest difference between the nativisms of the eighties and the nineties was one of intensity. The general temperature was hotter in the latter decade. We may read it by various gauges, for the intensification of nativism was apparent in action and legislation as well as in sentiment. Much of the evidence of this new intensity concerns the specific foci of agitation and is reserved for later pages. One overall aspect is relevant here as a keynote to the whole decade. Nativists in the 1890’s repeatedly championed the values of nationalism in a very conscious, explicit way. They discovered that American patriotism was undergoing a decline, a decline due partly to the immigrant’s disruptive and disloyal tendencies. They pleaded for a reawakened sense of nationality. Sometimes, in place of any specific accusation against the newcomers, they argued simply that a great nation requires a homogeneous people.” Nativists now were not just reflecting a revival of nationalism; they were its conscious apostles.

In this respect nativism formed but one part—though an important part—of the tide of national feeling that beat upon the American public during the last decade of the century. The period resounded with organized campaigns to arouse a vigorous “Americanism.” Flag exercises, replete with special salutes and pledges, spread throughout the public schools along with agitation for inculcating patriotism. Among well-to-do, status-conscious circles, over a dozen hereditary patriotic societies sprang up in the early nineties to cultivate a keener, more exclusive sense of nationality. Beginning with the Sons of the American Revolution in 1880, these prestige organizations embarked on a round of banquets, receptions, and celebrations. Their principal theme was always the dire importance of perpetuating the pure American spirit of one’s ancestors. Meanwhile a tempest raged within the ranks of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the United States, as a group of nationalistic clergies, largely Irish in background, denounced many of their German-American brethren for resisting Americanization and clinging to a divided loyalty. The chief socialist movement of the day called itself Nationalism and proposed “to realize the idea of the nation with a grandeur and completeness never before conceived.” Above all, these sentiments manifested themselves in astonishing belligerent attitudes toward foreign governments. Jingoism was the most aggressive expression of late nineteenth-century nationalism.

As early as 1889, when the United States asserted sweeping rights over the Bering Sea, public opinion was becoming sensitive to minor international controversies. Two years later there was talk of war with Italy and, because of a sailors’ brawl in a Valparaiso saloon, a more serious threat of conflict with Chile. In 1895 jingoist frenzy brought the United States close to war with Britain for the odd reason that Venezuela disputed her boundary with British Guiana. At that point the Cuban Revolution absorbed the jingoes in a crescendo of excitement culminating in the Spanish-American-War. It is hard to doubt that these bellicose outbursts flowed from the same domestic frustrations that generated nativism. The first important harbinger of both jingoism and nativism
was Josiah Strong, whose attack on immigration accompanied a grandiose vision of global conquest. Not all jingo were nativists or all nativists jingoists, but both the aggressive psychology of the one and the defensive reaction of the other provided instinctive rallying points for a society dubious of its capacity to compose its conflicts.33

To put the matter another way, when the troubles of the late nineteenth century raised doubts of the nation's stamina, two short cuts for restoring confidence presented themselves: disunion might be rationalized as a product of foreign influence, or denied by a compensatory demonstration of national virility. One response led toward protective measures at home, such as immigration restriction; the other encouraged an offensive posture abroad. Of the two, the jingoistic tactic was more exhilarating than the nativistic and closer to the habitual strut and swagger of the American spirit. It had, therefore, a greater immediate impact. Nativism fell short of its major objectives in the nineties, while jingoism carried the day.

As early as the late eighties, according to a scholarly observer at the time, Fourth of July orators were boasting of American national power instead of America's freedom from the social ills of Europe. And in 1896 a leading magazine described the public mood as follows:

This uncertainty and difference of opinion within party ranks have bred general suspicion and universal irritability. Moreover, the loose . . . talk about American principles and the American flag which has been in the air for the last two or three years has borne its fruit in what might be called an explosive condition of opinion in some sections of the country. . . . newspapers . . . have formed the habit of talking about foreign countries as if they were all the enemies of the United States, and as if to be a true American involved hatred of everything French, English, German, Italian, or Spanish . . . . In the general uncertainty about domestic questions, the confessed inability to deal with the currency question . . . and the hopeless groping about for something definite to stand on, the members of Congress have rushed bell-mell through any door of escape into a foreign field. The result has been that both parties have outdone each other in an attempt to take the most extreme positions and use the most violent language. . . .33

But if jingoism outdistanced nativism, it also aggravated it. The two anti-foreign movements—one international, the other internal—complemented each other, so that the jingoist atmosphere of the decade helps to explain the depth and intensity of its nativism. A public opinion chafing for conquest abroad was not likely to forego similar satisfactions at home. Furthermore, the jingo spirit jeopardized immigrant minorities very directly by creating a new sense of insecurity. After 1890 at least a flickering consciousness of global dangers and rivalries intruded upon the American public's complacent aloofness toward foreign relations; and a series of diplomatic crises shook the feeling of military security, which was one of the last bulwarks against nativism still intact. Consequently, the immigrants' national loyalties became a matter of greater moment, and suspicions that they harbored disloyal attachments to some threatening world power were more easily aroused.

Most of the foundations of the age of confidence had already been rudely shaken. One of them, indifference to social problems, had cracked in the eighties. A second basis of confidence, easy expectations of endless material expansion, was challenged by the restrictions of monopoly, the passing of the frontier, and the experience of grinding depression. When a wave of jingoism swept over the old indifference to international problems, the principal conditions upholding the assimilationist faith of the post-Civil War period were all in peril.

Anti-Catholicism Rampant

If nativism burst some of the limits that had previously confined it, its over-all ideological structure nevertheless remained for the most part unchanged. Grounded in social circumstances similar to those of the eighties, the nativism of the 1890's perpetuated all of the anti-foreign complaints that had circulated during the earlier decade. To reformers, the immigrants were the source of municipal squalor and corruption,44 to workingmen a drag on wages, to militant Protestants the tools of Rome; and to nearly all their critics the newcomers were agents of discord and strife. Thomas Nixon
Carver, a conservative economist, blamed them for precipitating a labor problem by widening the class gulf between capital and labor; the Nation on one occasion attributed the deep agrarian unrest in the West to “peasants fresh from Europe”; and the major strikes of the decade evoked repeated references to dangerous foreign rabble. Consequently, the anti-radical tradition remained a major nativist attitude, picturing the foreigner as steeped in anarchism or at least as an incendiary menace to that orderly freedom which Americans alone could supposedly preserve. And anti-Catholicism, in continuing to provide an alternative theme, blossomed spectacularly.

The vitality of both traditions is striking in view of the fact that both targets, the anarchist and the Pope, were less vulnerable to attack after 1890 than they had been before. Judged objectively, these nativist symbols should have seemed progressively less menacing, for the circumstances of the decade lent diminishing support to conceptions of the immigrant as an agent of either proletarian revolution or papal despotism. The most serious unrest developed among the native-born farmers who composed the Populist party; the most alarming strikes appeared among English-speaking steel workers and railroad employees. The anarchist movement was broken in Chicago, internally divided in New York, and except for an individual attack on Henry Clay Frick—outside of the public eye. Likewise, the Catholic Church gave less occasion for religious nativism than it had a few years before. After 1890 the specific conflicts of the previous decade over relations between church and state reached a better adjustment, and the leading Catholic prelates went out of their way to demonstrate their attachment to American institutions. Non-Catholic pressure for state regulation of parochial schools abated, the federal government gradually withdrew from collaboration with religious bodies in Indian education, and prominent Catholic spokesmen showed a friendlier attitude toward the public school system. To be sure, a vast public display of Catholic strength at the time of the Chicago World’s Fair caused some heartburning, and the appointment in the same year of Archbishop Francis Satolli as the Pope’s first permanent delegate to the United States struck a number of Protestants as an act of insidious aggression. But these were minor incidents.

In the case of anti-radicalism the fact that the target was less in evidence did seem to blunt the hostility. Even the most irrational attitudes secure a focus from the objective situation which they represent as well as misrepresent; “prejudices,” in distorting reality, still reflect it. Revolutionary immigrants never caused enough real, sustained anxiety in the nineteenth century to rouse Congress to a legislative ban. Although an explicit anti-radicalism persisted, to a considerable extent the image of foreign radicals became diffuse. It tended to dissolve into vaguer visions of foreign license, lawlessness, and disorder. The adversary usually remained a symbol of unruly discontent, but he assumed a more protean, indefinite shape. Often he seemed to lose almost all distinguishing traits and become simply un-American, so that the anti-radical tradition partially blended with jingoism. Thus the hereditary patriotic societies, while characterizing “the foreign element” as abandoned to anarchy, socialism, and lawlessness, more frequently reduced the newcomer’s crime to simpler terms: he “threatens to smother and obliterate American predominance, American influence, and American ideas and institutions.”

On the other hand, anti-Catholic nativism retained its piercing directness and redoubled its energy. Catholics, after all, were still prominent on the American scene, their multiplying churches ever more visible in the cities of the North and West, their influence in local politics undiminished. In fact, the general Democratic victories in the elections of 1890 and 1892 inevitably worked to the advantage of Irish politicians and therefore exacerbated anti-Catholic feeling; for Protestant xenophobes interpreted the election results, of course, as further Roman aggression. Perhaps, too, the idea that papal minions posed a subversive threat to national freedom was so deeply entrenched in myth and memory that it needed relatively little objective confirmation.

No other xenophobia functioned in so highly organized a way as anti-Romanism. Its agencies, aside from the Protestant churches themselves, were of three types. The ad hoc committees, such as the National League for the Protection of American Institutions or the Citizens’ Committee of One Hundred of Cook County, worked in the open, endeavoring to mobilize broad support for specific legislative objectives. The nativist fraternal orders collaborated in such lobbying activities but otherwise held aloof from politics. The orders functioned more as prestige groups than as
pressure groups, in that sense resembling the hereditary patriotic societies which served a higher social stratum. The Junior Order United American Mechanics, combining anti-radical with anti-Catholic nativism, emerged in the nineties as the undisputed leader among such organizations. It reached a membership of 160,000 and took a vigorous part in the agitation for immigration restriction.\textsuperscript{44}

Neither the ad hoc committee nor the old-fashioned fraternal order approached in militancy the political secret society. It alone could satisfy the urge for political power. A struggle to drive the Irish Catholic adversary from his position in American politics offered very real rewards, and the lure of power provided one of the outstanding incentives for anti-Catholic organizations. Among groups of this type, the American Protective Association most effectively exploited both the political ambitions and the broad, national anxieties on which anti-Catholicism thrived. It absorbed many of the other nativist societies which had sprouted in the eighties and dominated the gaullist wave of religious nativism in fifty years.

Until 1893 the A.P.A. grew steadily but unspectacularly in the upper Mississippi Valley from eastern Nebraska to Michigan, taking root in larger towns and cities where Catholics were rising in political and social status. Under Henry F. Bowers' persevering leadership, the organization combined some of the characteristics of a secret fraternal order with a primary interest in politics. Bowers, who was a devoted Mason, presumably borrowed heavily from Masonry in concocting a black and yellow regalia, an elaborate initiation, and a recreational program. More important, Masonic lodges, being tinged by an anti-Catholic heritage, provided a source of membership for the A.P.A., and often a body of political allies.\textsuperscript{45} By 1891 the A.P.A. was strongly established in Omaha and helped the Republicans, whom it endorsed, to sweep that usually Democratic city by large majorities. Twelve months later, in Saginaw, Michigan, the A.P.A. elected William S. Linton to Congress, where he remained its chief spokesman. Yet, up to 1893, membership did not exceed seventy thousand.\textsuperscript{46}

That year the society flared suddenly into national prominence, first tightening its grip on the Midwest and then spreading eastward and westward. It grew very rapidly throughout the Great Lakes area, crossed into western New York and Pennsylvania, and pushed as far east as Massachusetts. In November 1893, it claimed ten thousand members in Columbus, Ohio, sixteen thousand in Buffalo, and similar strength in Pittsburgh.\textsuperscript{47} Meanwhile A.P.A. councils blossomed in Denver and other Rocky Mountain towns, in San Francisco, and in Seattle. During the first half of 1894 the A.P.A. reached its crest. Altogether, it may have enrolled a cumulative total of half a million members. Although it was becoming an important force in a number of East and West Coast cities, the center of its power remained in the Midwest. Michigan, Ohio, and Minnesota were probably the leading A.P.A. states, in approximately that order. An effort to organize the South made little headway below Kentucky. (Southerners were generally apathetic toward anti-Catholicism and viewed the A.P.A. as a Republican tool.) Everywhere the movement got the great bulk of its support in urban communities, although its influence now spread into rural areas of the Midwest also.\textsuperscript{48}

Some of this growth resulted from the new leadership which the A.P.A. acquired in 1893. Control passed from Bowers' elderly hands into the more agile ones of William J. Traynor, who had built a strong organization in Michigan as president of the state council. "Whiskey Bill," as the Catholics called him, was a former saloonkeeper, a nativist newspaper publisher, and a veteran of the Order of the American Union, with long experience in promoting anti-Catholic organizations. He had a keener political sense than Bowers and immediately launched an aggressive organizing drive.\textsuperscript{49} But the tide of sentiment he manipulated was surely not of his making. The upthrust of the A.P.A. corresponded too closely to the general expansion and intensification of nativism to be due chiefly to internal causes. Only the depression of 1893 can adequately explain the surge of Protestant nativism that year.

A.P.A. organizers fastened to exploit the climate of economic disaster. Wherever men would listen, they blamed the collapse on the Catholics, who had started a run on the banks—so the story went—in order to disrupt the economic system and thus prepare the way for Rome's seizure of power. A.P.A. speakers told crowds of unemployed that their jobs had gone to a flood of immigrants unloosed on America by papal agents. To prove their charges, the agitators invented and distributed very widely a document entitled, "Instructions to Catholics," supposedly from the Pope. From
this, the credulous learned that Rome was preparing desperate measures to get jobs for Catholic immigrants: “In order to find employment for the many thousands of the faithful who are coming daily to swell the ranks of our Catholic army, which will in due time possess this land, we must secure control of... every enterprise requiring labor... this will render it necessary to remove or crowd out the American heretics who are now employed.”

Since the depression embittered class conflict, the A.P.A. profited from social as well as economic frustrations. For lower-middle and working class people bewildered by the clash of organized capital and organized labor, the A.P.A. preached the same message carried by the smaller nativist societies of the eighties—but preached it more widely and explicitly. Industrial unrest was explained as simply another form of papal subversion. According to the A.P.A., the Catholics, sometimes in the person of T. V. Powderly, were fomenting strikes and labor problems as part of a larger plot to overthrow American institutions. Protestants were warned to avoid all unions dominated by papists, to discard the strike as a useless device, and to place no confidence in free silver. This advice made so strong an impression that Eugene Debs, the militant labor leader, and Ignatius Donnelly, the fiery Populist, called the A.P.A. an instrument designed by railroad magnates to disorganize labor unions. In fact, A.P.A.-ism did have a disruptive impact on unionism, and not only among railroad employees. In the coal fields of Pennsylvania and Illinois this internecine strife checked a United Mine Workers’ organizing drive; in many cases it tore existing locals apart. Yet, along with a covert anti-union bias, the A.P.A. also reverberated with vague alarms at plutocracy. Strictures on monopoly appeared in the pages of its publications, Traynor promised to bring justice from “soulless corporations and greedy syndicates,” and one A.P.A. council (championing small business against monopolies) resolved that no one should be allowed to accumulate more than a million dollars.

These attitudes, although important for understanding the A.P.A.’s appeal, formed no part of its official creed. Far from dealing directly with social and economic conflicts, Protestant nativism converted them into religious and nationalistic ones. The association deliberately excluded the major issues of the day when it drew up a formal program early in 1894. It proposed simply to defend “true Americanism” against the “subjects of an un-American ecclesiastical institution” by fighting for a free public school system, for immigration restriction, and for a slower, more rigid system of naturalization.

A.P.A. spokesmen regarded the immigration question as second only to the religious one, but it was distinctly secondary. Although unofficially they made drastic demands at times, their lobbying for restriction was slight and ineffective. This was largely because of the organization’s curiously mixed membership. In its quest for power the A.P.A. welcomed support wherever anti-Catholic nationalism flourished. Such sentiment thrived among foreign-born Protestants from Canada, Britain, and Scandinavia. Many of these newcomers found in their own Protestant traditions a source of identification with America; and they hated the Irish, to whom they felt culturally superior but who seemed proportionally more successful than they in capturing local political offices. Accordingly, the A.P.A., while claiming “America for the Americans,” appealed to “all who will be true Americans,” regardless of nationality, race, or place of birth. So many Scandinavians joined that the A.P.A. organ in Minneapolis merged with a leading Scandinavian newspaper. British Canadians flocked in and even extended the association across the border into Canada. In many places, Orangemen, born in Britain or Canada, formed the nucleus. Traynor himself was Canadian-born and held the vice-presidency of the Grand Orange Lodge along with the presidency of the A.P.A. Sometimes these naturalized groups favored immigration restriction, but not for their own nationality. An explicit and emphatic anti-foreigner campaign could swiftly alienate the northern European A.P.A.-ers.

It was safer to stress the Catholic issue; the oath, which all members took, never to vote for a Catholic, indicates the A.P.A.’s governing preoccupation. By endorsing some candidates and condemning others as pro-Roman, “advisory boards” in each city and state manipulated the votes of the membership and of sympathizers. Since support went almost invariably to Republican candidates, Democrats denounced the organization roundly, while Republicans tended to temporize. In the spring of 1893 the A.P.A. showed substantial strength in midwestern municipal and school
board elections, and that fall it contributed to William McKinley's phenomenally successful re-election as Ohio governor. The next year it took an active interest in elections in nearly half of the states. Both were Republican years; consequently, the A.P.A. was able to claim much more strength than it really had. But it did help to send a number of sympathizers to Congress. In a few states, notably Michigan, Kentucky, and Nebraska, the organization enjoyed the favor and confidence of the Republican high command.48

Much energy blew off in the form of propaganda, particularly through the lectures of ex-priests and nuns exposing the horrors of convent life. Very generally, A.P.A. members boycotted Catholic merchants and discriminated against Catholic labor. On the other hand, the amount of physical violence produced by the anti-Catholic hysteria of the nineties was not great. Rocks were sometimes thrown through priests' windows, and infuriated Catholics repeatedly attacked A.P.A. lecturers,49 but no successful lynching occurred. There were three Protestant-Catholic riots, two of which involved the A.P.A. directly. One of these, a day-long battle that raged in and around the saloons of Montana's leading mining town on the Fourth of July, 1894, resulted in two deaths. The other was a general shooting fray at a polling place in Kansas City, Missouri, during the municipal election that year. An A.P.A. leader and several Catholics were killed.49 In these and other instances the A.P.A. created some violence, partly because it had belligerent adversaries.

The supreme violence occurred inside men's heads. Anti-Catholicism reached a climax in ideology rather than action by absorbing and reflecting the decade's rampant jingoism. Since religious nativists had always regarded Catholics as disloyal adherents of a foreign potentate, the anti-Catholic tradition was easily susceptible to jingoist influence. Eyeing their Catholic neighbors, Protestant nationalists could enjoy a tingling sense of confronting the waiting soldiery of an enemy state. In the mid-nineties, without the provocation of actual international friction, the papacy took a place alongside Chile, Italy, and Great Britain as one of the powers against which an inflamed populace prepared to do battle.

Fears of a long-range papal scheme to overthrow American institutions had bothered a good many Protestants during the early

nineteenth century, but only in 1893 did Americans gird themselves to meet an imminent Catholic uprising. Early that year Traynor's newspaper, the Detroit Patriotic American, gave wide circulation to a document that disclosed the impending papish plot. The document was a bogus encyclical addressed to American Catholics by Pope Leo XIII. It absolved them from any oaths of loyalty to the United States and instructed them "to exterminate all heretics" on a certain date in September. A Minneapolis agitator, Burton Ames Huntington, improved on the story in a book designed to show that seven hundred thousand papal soldiers—organized in all large American cities—were ready to spring into rebellion at a moment's notice. Rome's policy, he asserted, was to force "us Americans . . . to rebel against Rome's usurpations" and then to carry out a counterrevolution under the pretext of restoring law and order. He urged his readers to organize and arm themselves but not to start anything.49 The whole book quivered with a militant nationalism much like that evoked by the diplomatic crises of the period.

Reprinted throughout the nativist press, in leaflets and in handbills, these tales struck panic far and wide. Catholic meetings were spied upon for evidence of military preparations. In Toledo the mayor, the police commissioner, and others bought Winchester rifles to repel an anticipated invasion, and many A.P.A. members were afraid to go to bed at night. The Catholic war scare had greatest impact, however, in midwestern rural areas where "flesh-and-blood" Catholics were virtually nonexistent and the enemy lay far away in the cities. Illinois farmers feared to leave home lest Romanists burn their barns and houses. A rural schoolteacher in Minnesota went about heavily armed for weeks to defend himself against the anticipated massacre. A large part of the population in some of the smaller towns of Ohio was terrorized by bloodcurdling reports of the preparations for war which the Catholics in Columbus were supposedly making.49

This phase passed in a few months. Indeed, the vitality drained out of the whole anti-Catholic movement well before the other currents of late nineteenth century nativism subsided. While other xenophobias were still growing, anti-Catholicism began to decline in the latter part of 1894. In part it was discredited by internal dissensions which were splitting the A.P.A. Like every secret
political organization in American history, the A.P.A. lent itself
to exploitation for private advantage. Office-seekers used it and
then ignored it; factions wrestled for control of it. After the elec-
tion of 1894 failed to produce results commensurate with the
leadership's hopes, the strife increased. Traynor led an unsuccessful
movement for establishing a third party, others insisted on endors-
ing McKinley, and the society virtually fell apart over this issue
in the spring of 1896. Meanwhile tension between the old Ameri-
can and immigrant wings seems also to have caused numerous
defections. Many Scandinavians lost sympathy with the A.P.A.
as its anti-foreign tinge became increasingly emphatic; in Minne-
sota the order started downhill in the spring of 1894, while it was
still advancing elsewhere. In addition to these disruptive tendencies, the A.P.A. suffered
from the limitations of anti-Catholic nationalism. This idea no
longer provided an adequately comprehensive expression of nativist
ferment. Whatever respectability the tradition had once possessed
was largely gone. In an increasingly secular culture, enthusiastic
religion was passing out of middle-class life, and without it the
belief that popery lay behind the major national perils was hard
to sustain. Furthermore, by the late nineteenth century many
Catholics had become assimilated into "respectable" society, mak-
ing editors and politicians reluctant to lose their support by ex-
pressing sentiments critical of their religion. No outstanding poli-
tical leader adhered publicly to the anti-Catholic line which Hayes,
Grant, and others had followed in the early seventies. Harper's
Weekly retreated from its earlier ebullience into a cautious neu-
trality, and only two or three articles sympathetic to the A.P.A.
appeared in the general magazines. Even many Protestant clergy-
men who were outspokenly anti-foreign avoided the anti-Catholic
theme. The A.P.A.'s old-fashioned nativism had little attraction
for the higher strata of American society.

By the same token this tradition-bound nativism failed to profit
from new and rising xenophobias. It lacked a race consciousness
that might have appealed to the South—the A.P.A. welcomed
Negro support—and among particular nationalities it had eyes
only for the menace of the Irish. Although the A.P.A. feared
aliens in general, it never appreciated the shift that was under way
in the sources of immigration. A product of the Middle West, the
association arose and flourished most vigorously in a section which
had as yet no great number of southern and eastern Europeans.
The A.P.A. spent its declining strength belaboring the Irish stand-
ard-bearers of Catholicism while other nationalities were moving
into the orbit of American nativism.

Nationalism and the New Immigrants

Unlike the older Catholic population, the southern and eastern
Europeans who had begun to arrive in considerable numbers
during the 1880's lived in the American imagination only in the
form of a few vague, ethnic stereotypes. They occupied, in other
words, no distinctive place, either separately or collectively, in the
traditions of American nationalism. In the 1890's, for the first time,
they became a significant factor in the growth of nativism. An
initial distrust, compounded largely out of their culture and ap-
pearance, swelled into a pressing sense of menace, into hatred, and
into violence. This process went forward essentially along two
lines: first and most commonly, the general anti-foreign feelings
touched off by the internal and international shocks of the late
nineteenth century were discharged with special force against
these new targets so that each of the southeastern European groups
appeared as a particularly insidious representative of the whole
foreign menace; secondly and more slowly, a campaign got under
way against the new immigration as a unique entity, constituting
in its difference from other foreign groups the essence of the na-
tion's peril. The first type of attack was midwife to the second.
The new immigrants had the very bad luck to arrive in America
en masse at a time when nativism was already running at full tide,
and when neither anarchist nor Jesuit afforded a wholly satisfac-
tory victim for it.

The hostilities which southeastern Europeans faced depended
partly on their increasing prominence on the American scene.
During the early nineties, peasants and Jews poured out of south-
ern and eastern Europe in ever larger numbers, fleeing from pov-
erty and inhumanity to a new promised land. Cutthroat competi-
tion among the transatlantic steamship companies eased their flight;
steerage rates on first-class boats dropped to $10 or even less. The
depression sharply reduced all immigration, but the new current
never fell below one hundred thousand persons per year—a level it had first reached in 1887. More exclusively than most older immigrant groups, the new ones swarmed into the slums, the factories, and the mines. Either urbanites or industrial workers, and usually both, they played a role in American life that lent itself to nativist interpretation. In the crowded places where they made their homes, they lived as a class apart, the least assimilated and most impoverished of the immigrants. Hence, they symbolized vividly the social and economic ills with which nativists identified the immigrants generally. Fears of developing class cleavage could easily center on them; and with less perversion of logic than anti-Catholicism required, the problems of depression and unrest could be associated with them. Above all, each of the southern and eastern European nationalities seemed to Americans in some way a disturber of the peace, thereby focalizing the fear of foreign-bred discontent.

On the other hand, the new immigrants, although vulnerable as symbols of a general foreign problem, did not yet stand out readily as a collective entity. Until 1896 the old influx from northern and western Europe surpassed the southern and eastern European current. All in all, at least 80 per cent of the European-born population of the United States in the mid-nineties still derived from those accustomed sources—Germany, Great Britain, Scandinavia, France, Switzerland, and the Low Countries. Furthermore, concentration of settlement limited the impact of the new groups. While a few coastal cities and industrial complexes felt their arrival sharply, large parts of the country hardly knew them at all. Two-thirds of the first-generation Italians, for example, settled in the mid-Atlantic and New England states. Most of America was just beginning to learn of their presence, largely at secondhand. Consequently most of the hatred of Italians, Slavs, and Jews consisted of general anti-foreign attitudes refracted through specific national stereotypes.

The Slavic coal miners of Pennsylvania illustrate very well how the new immigration inherited a wider, pre-existing animus. They acquired the immigrant's standard reputation for disorder in an unusually simple, direct form. The American mind contained, apparently, no distinctive "Slavic" stereotype, comparable to Italian and Jewish stereotypes, which might have individualized the hostile response." Consequently Slavic and Magyar laborers impressed public opinion at large simply as foreigners par excellence: uncivilized, unruly, and dangerous.

The impression fed upon the Slavic coal miners' sporadic but increasing involvement in labor unrest. Ironically, while other workingmen continued to despise them as cheap and docile competitors, the general public fixed its eyes on their lapses from docility. Already the Slavs had incurred the indignation of employers for participating in the coke strike of 1886; during the greater industrial conflicts of the nineties, they encountered the hostility of the whole middle-class community. By 1891, when Henry Clay Frick precipitated a strike of fourteen thousand coke workers by posting a new wage scale, Slavic and Magyar nationalities well outnumbered the older immigrants and native Americans in the bituminous fields. Although British and Americans led the strike, it was generally interpreted as an uprising of "Huns," who, in the words of the New York Tribune, were "the most dangerous of labor-unionists and strikers. They fill up with liquor and cannot be reasoned with." The company brought in nonunion workers, a step which resulted in riots and vandalism on the part of the strikers. In this tense situation, a crowd of "Huns," returning from a mass meeting, passed a frightened detachment of state militia guarding a company store. Someone fired a shot, the strikers fled, and the militia fired two volleys after them. Ten dead and fifty wounded immigrants littered the road. According to the Tribune, the militia's action was "upheld by businessmen and all law-abiding people in the entire region." 80

Frick finally succeeded in breaking the strike, though he was to face a similar walkout three years later. This time an immigrant mob killed Frick's chief engineer, causing the Pittsburgh Times to report that the whole region was "trembling on the brink of an insurrection. Never before were the dangerous foreigners so thoroughly aroused." A sheriff's posse, equally aroused, pursued the escaping strikers, shooting several and arresting 138 for murder. No sooner was this strike defeated than a general work stoppage throughout the bituminous coal fields ensued, bringing its quota of violence and police brutalities. 81

The bloodiest episode occurred in 1897. While the United Mine Workers Union was leading the new immigrants to victory
in the bituminous fields, an attempt to launch a strike in the anthracite country provoked disaster. About 150 Polish and Hungarian strikers, entirely unarmed, set out from Hazleton, Pennsylvania, toward a nearby town, intent on urging the men there to join the walkout. The sheriff, persuaded by the coal owners that an organized march was illegal, gathered a posse of 102 deputies to intercept it. As the strikers came in sight, the sheriff ordered them to return. Someone struck him, frightening him into commanding the deputies to fire. They poured volley after volley into the surprised and terrorized crowd as it stampeded in flight. They killed twenty-one immigrants and wounded forty more. The sheriff, a former mine foreman, explained that the crowd consisted of "infiltrated foreigners . . . like wild beasts." Other mine foremen agreed that if the strikers had been American-born no blood would have flowed.43

In the case of the Italians, a rather similar fear of "infiltrated foreigners" took a different twist. Anti-foreign sentiment filtered through a specific ethnic stereotype when Italians were involved; for in American eyes they bore the mark of Cain. They suggested the stiletto, the Mafia, the deed of impassioned violence. "The disposition to assassinate in revenge for a fancied wrong," declared the Baltimore News, "is a marked trait in the character of this impulsive and inexorable race." Every time a simple Italian laborer resorted to his knife, the newspapers stressed the fact of his nationality; the most trivial fracas in Mulberry Street caused a headline on "Italian Vendetta."44 The stereotype conditioned every major outburst of anti-Italian sentiment in the 1890's. The distinctive nativism which swarthy paezani experienced took the guise of social discipline applied to alleged acts of homicide.

Time and again, lynchings parties struck at Italians charged with murder. In 1891 a wild rumor that drunken Italian laborers had cut the throats of a whole American family in West Virginia set off further rumors of a pitched battle between a sheriff's posse and the assassins. In 1895, when the southern Colorado coal fields were gripped by violent labor strife, a group of miners and other residents systematically massacred six Italian workers implicated in the death of an American saloonkeeper. A year later a mob dragged three Italians from jail in a small Louisiana town and hanged them.45 The biggest incident convulsed New Orleans—and then the whole country—at the beginning of the decade. The city combined southern folkways with all of the social problems of the urban North, and as the most southerly of American ports, it was the haven of a large migration from Sicily. In 1891 the superintendent of police was murdered under conditions which pointed to the local Sicilian population. Wholesale arrests followed in an atmosphere of hysteria. The mayor issued a public appeal: "We must teach these people a lesson that they will not forget for all time." The city council appointed a citizens' committee to suggest ways of preventing the influx of European criminals. But when some of the accused were tried, the jury (which may have been suborned) stunned the city by refusing to convict. While officials stood idly by, a mob proceeded "to remedy the failure of justice" by lynching eleven Italian suspects. With apparent unanimity local newspapers and business leaders blessed the action.44

At that point jingoism intruded upon what had begun as a local, internal episode, transforming it into a nation-wide commotion and a diplomatic crisis. Italy sought redress for the victims' families and punishment of the mob that murdered them. Secretary of State James G. Blaine treated the plea cavalierly, whereupon Italy abruptly recalled her minister in Washington. Internal hatred and external conflict now interacted directly, producing an explosion of feeling against Italy and enormously magnifying the fear of Italian-Americans. A belief that the Italian fleet might suddenly descend on the United States gained fairly wide credence, and patriots flexed their muscles in preparation. Italians within the country now appeared as a potential fifth column; obviously these people could not be depended upon in times of national danger.

There were reports of Italian immigrants riddling an American flag with bullets; a rumor circulated that several uniformed corps of Italians were drilling in New York.46 In Wheeling, West Virginia, miners went on strike because their employer refused to discharge two Italians; the strikers vowed they would not work with men "allied to a nation that was trying to bring about a war with the United States." A patriotic society demanded war if Italy continued shipping criminals to the United States. The Review of Reviews saw two lessons in the affair: that America must have a navy to protect itself from "wanton insult," and an immigration
policy to keep out "the refuse of the murder-breeds of Southern Europe." 66

Clearly, as the Review pointed out, a revival of Americanism was emerging from the New Orleans incident. Not just Italian immigration but the whole immigration question was dramatized as nothing had dramatized it since the Haymarket Affair. The press, the pulpit, and the magazines rang with demands for stringent restriction. The influential Nation concluded that a secure modern state rested on community of language and proposed therefore to limit immigration to English-speaking applicants. This severe met considerable favor. 67

The third major group in the new immigration, the Jews, was also buffeted by the nativism and jingoism of the nineties. They had, of course, their own unique status, fixed by the ancient Shylock stereotype; they stood for chicane rather than crime or revolution. (The American public had heard little as yet about the radical labor movements stirring in the New York ghetto.) 68 But the Jews' supposedly unscrupulous greed now seemed as potentially subversive as the doings of bloodthirsty Italians, "furious Huns," or Irish papists. Hatred, rooted in much the same conditions, lashed them all in rather similar ways.

The Jews felt, too, the violence endemic in that period. Beginning in the late eighties, the first serious anti-Semitic demonstrations in American history occurred in parts of the lower South where Jewish supply merchants were common. In several parishes of Louisiana debt-ridden farmers stormed into town, wrecked Jewish stores, and threatened to kill any Jews who remained in the area. During the worst year, 1893, night-riders burned dozens of farmhouses belonging to Jewish landlords in southern Mississippi, and open threats drove a substantial number of Jewish businessmen from Louisiana. 69 Persecution in northern cities generally took the form of personal taunts and assaults. Russo-Polish Jews had been stoned occasionally in the early eighties, and in the next decade this petty kind of Jew-baiting became much more common. 70 One serious incident broke out in a New Jersey mill town in 1891. Five hundred tending boys employed in the local glass works went on a rampage when the management hired fourteen young Russian Jews. Three days of riotous demonstrations caused most of the Jewish residents to flee from the area. 71 In one sense the Jews came off a little better than the other minorities; apparently no lives were lost in any of these episodes.

A substantial ideological onslaught accompanied the physical assaults, however. In response to the tensions of the 1890's, the Shylock stereotype—which tended to obscure distinctions between the relatively well-to-do German Jews and the newcomers from eastern Europe—assumed a new potency. To some nativists, the Jews were capable of dominating or ruining American business. Tradition connected Jews with gold, which was becoming one of the major touchstones of internal strife. After 1890 the government's determination to maintain the gold standard excited enormous discontent and defined the great political issue of the period. Since greedy, destructive forces seemed somehow at work in the government and economy, suspicion dawned that a Jewish bid for supremacy was wreaking the havoc America could not control. Agrarian radicals, absorbed in a passionate crusade for free silver, sometimes yielded to this conjecture, but the idea was not theirs alone. The patrician Henry Adams concluded that the United States lay at the mercy of the Jews, and a New York workingman vowed: "The Russian Jews and the other Jews will completely control the finances and Government of this country in ten years, or they will all be dead... The hatred with which they are regarded... ought to be a warning to them. The people of this country... won't be starved and driven to the wall by Jews who are guilty of all the crimes, tricks and wiles that have hitherto been unknown and unthought of by civilized humanity." 72

Here too jingoism played a part. It was not enough for jingo-inflamed nativists to see the Jews solely as an internal threat. They were a people without a national state or center of power: an international people. Since gold was becoming, in fact, a more and more firmly established international standard, millions of Americans associated their country's troubles with an international medium of exchange and felt themselves in the toils of a world-wide money-power. Did the Jews perhaps have an international loyalty above all governments, a quenchless resolve to rule the world themselves? For at least a few nativists, the new tendency to see America's adversaries operating on a world stage inflated the
Jewish peril from one of national subversion to one of world domination. An occasional eastern conservative detected a clandestine Jewish league controlling the money markets of the world, or blamed the depression on Jewish bankers who were said to be shipping America’s gold to Europe. Western agrarians not infrequently slipped into similar allusions. Minnesotan’s Ignatius Donnelly wrote a utopian novel, *Caesar’s Column*, prophesying a totally degraded society ruled by a Jewish world oligarchy. The greatest of the silverites, William Jennings Bryan, bluntly accused President Cleveland of putting the country in the hands of the English Rothschilds.

In nineteenth century America, even so, the menace of world Jewry was undoubtedly less important than related fears of Italians and Catholics. Certainly the vision of an Italian fifth column precipitated more immediate consequences, and the expectation of a papal uprising created greater hysteria. The chief significance of the “International Jew” lay far in the future. Denationalized and universal, the symbol curiously mingled jingoism with isolationism. It was less a summons to fight than a command to withdraw, and its full impact would not come until American nationalism reverted from a strategy of belligerent intervention to one of belligerent isolation.

For understanding late nineteenth century nativism, it is not the latent possibilities of the new anti-Semitism which need emphasis, but rather the common qualities in the assaults on the various new immigrant nationalities. No longer scorned simply for “mere habits of life,” each of the major groups from southern and eastern Europe stood forth as a challenge to the nation, either endangering American institutions by unruly behavior or threatening through avarice to possess them. In lashing out at each of these ethnic groups, a distraught society secured a whole set of new adversaries.

On the other hand, the discovery that the miscellaneous Slavs, Jews, and Italians constituted a collective type, a “new immigration,” dawned more gradually. The concept of a new immigration would seem to have been largely the work of cultivated minds rather than a simple derivative of popular instincts. Certainly mass opinion in the nineties pictured the Italian, the Slav, and the Jew—chiefly within the context of a general foreign peril. The fact of a rising influx of southern Europeans with unusually low living standards had been mentioned as early as 1884 in the discussion of the contract labor bill but did not receive much notice. Occasionally in the late eighties and with increasing frequency after 1890, a few keen observers in the East pointed to the proportional decline of northwestern European entrants. After 1890, as the comfortable belief faded that this was a mere, temporary eddy in the migratory stream, a handful of nativist intellectuals confronted the problem of defining the general threat which the whole movement from southern and eastern Europe raised to the nation’s destiny.

Neither of the major traditions of nativist thought quite fitted the problem. The anti-radical theme, with its fears of imported discontent, applied to Europeans as a whole, and surely the new immigrants presented a more docile appearance than did Irish labor leaders or the German anarchists who hanged for the Haymarket Affair. Anti-Catholic nationalism, aside from failing to account for the new Jewish immigration, reeked of religious fanaticism which literate and cultured people now disavowed. On the eve of the A.P.A.’s rise to national prominence, a typical nativist intellectual rejoiced that the present movement against immigration would be free from attacks on Catholics. There was, however, a third nativist tradition—weaker than the other two but more adaptable to the purpose at hand. The old idea that America belonged peculiarly to the Anglo-Saxon race would define the special danger of the new immigration if one assumed that northern Europeans were at least first cousins to the Anglo-Saxons.

Eastern patrician intellectuals had been the keepers of the Anglo-Saxon tradition since the Civil War, and in the climate of the nineties it was not difficult for some of them to convert a doctrine that defined their own sense of nationality into censure of an immigrant throng that displayed few common traits except the indubitable fact that it was not Anglo-Saxon. Hardly had the new immigration begun to attract attention when race-conscious intellectuals discovered its hereditary taint. In 1890 the Brahmin president of the American Economic Association alerted his fellow scholars to the new tide of “races of . . . the very lowest stage of
degradation." About the same time Henry Cabor Lodge noticed the shift away from northwestern Europe and began to bristle at its racial consequences.18

When Lodge raised the banner of race against the new immigration, it acquired its most dangerous adversary. As Massachusetts’ scholar-in-politics, he dominated both the intellectual and legislative phases of nativism. To this dual role, Lodge’s own interests and values imperiously summoned him; he embodied in remarkable degree some of the major forces underlying late nineteenth century xenophobia. From his precise Vandyke beard to his clipped Boston accent, Lodge was the model of a patrician. He was steeped in English culture—English to the last fiber of his thought, said Henry Adams—in pride of ancestry, and in nostalgia for New England’s past. During the 1870’s he had plunged into a study of the Anglo-Saxons; a thesis on early Anglo-Saxon law brought him the first Ph.D. that Harvard conferred in political science.19 Secondly, connected with Lodge’s race consciousness was a morbid sensitivity to the danger of extensive social change. He had a lively repugnance for both the rising plutocracy and the restive mob, and he felt acutely the general nativist response to class conflict. By 1888, as a fledgling Congressman, he was pointing to the diminishing supply of free land in the West and the growth of unrest in the East as reasons for restricting immigration. Finally, while attacking immigration in domestic affairs, Lodge was adopting a belligerent stance in foreign affairs.20 His campaign against the new immigration during the 1890’s interlaced with a jingoist crusade for expansion. Lodge the jingo hated England as much as Lodge the Anglo-Saxon loved the English; accordingly, his diplomatic belligerence took the form of an assertion of American power, his pleas for restriction a defense of the English race. But these and other inconsistencies in the life of the cold, cultivated little Senator were merely logical. They were resolved at another level—in the emotions of nationalism which shaped and guided his career.

Although the Anglo-Saxon tradition in the mid-nineties still swayed few outside of an eastern elite, through Lodge and others around him that elite occupied a position of strategic influence. Both the ideological instrument and the political leadership necessary to bring into a single focus the chaotic resentments against the new immigrant were therefore at hand.

Immigration Restriction

For all of the hysterias and hatreds of the decade, federal policy was hard to change. From the founding of the republic, nativists had never succeeded in permanently undoing the nation’s tolerant, laissez-faire policy toward European immigrants. Only once had that policy been seriously endangered—when the Federalists in 1798 passed the famous Alien Acts. One of these extended the residence requirement for citizenship from five to fourteen years; a second authorized the President to expel foreigners by executive decree; a third gave him still broader power over enemy aliens in case of war. Although these measures had an intimidating effect for a brief period, they did not become fully operative. In 1802 the Jeffersonians repealed the new naturalization law and restored the old five-year requirement. The Alien Friends Act lapsed by its own terms in 1803.21 The Alien Enemies Act lingered on the statute books unused and forgotten.

The nativist upsurge in the mid-nineteenth century left federal policy even less touched. Nor did the new excitments of the eighties and nineties really overturn the existing pattern. New and significant legislative trends started, but the decisive action for which nativists pressed just barely escaped their grasp. Immigration was one of the cornerstones of the whole social structure, and a cosmopolitan ideal of nationality was woven deeply into America’s Christian and democratic heritage. The stone could not be dislodged or the ideal renounced with ease.22

The raising of naturalization requirements had customarily formed the chief legislative objective of nativists. At bottom, they sought to limit the political power of the foreign-born, the ballot being the main practical prerogative of citizenship. Demands for lengthening and tightening the system of naturalization—an outgrowth of every nativist movement after 1789—burst forth again in the 1880’s and 1890’s. Some wanted to double the waiting period; some would raise it to twenty-one years. The cry came from all sorts of sources: from anti-Catholics bent on political power for themselves, from businessmen looking for a nativistic alternative to immigration restriction, from municipal reformers anxious to purge corruption from civic life.23 Indeed, there were
good grounds for stricter naturalization, with agents of both parties herding immigrants before pliant judges, paying for their naturalization papers, and then escorting them to the polls. But neither party would surrender the privilege; the system continued unchanged. And while immigrants voted in eastern cities by fraud, in the early eighties they did so legally in approximately eighteen western and southern states and territories. The fact that voting qualifications were set by the individual states had permitted many of them to offer the ballot to new settlers upon a simple declaration of intention to become a citizen. A trend back to the historic limitation of suffrage to citizens began in the late eighties, but at the end of the century eleven jurisdictions still granted aliens the right to vote.

At the national level the principal nativist effort was shifting from the question of naturalization to that of immigration restriction. The springs of modern American nativism lay in the social and economic problems of an urban-industrial society. Few nativists could regard a limitation of the foreign vote as much of a remedy for those problems. The loss of the ballot would not prevent anarchists from fomenting a revolution, or stay the rift between classes, or counteract depressions, or stop the new immigrants from polluting Anglo-Saxon blood, or keep Italian criminals and Jewish bankers from subversive activity. To cope with these dangers, the nativist was certain that the United States would have to reduce and refine the stream of immigration. Restriction became his overriding aim.

From the outset the Republican party provided the main vehicle for restrictionist sentiment. It never monopolized or committed itself wholly to the movement, but it supplied the principal leaders, most of the energy, and most of the votes. Throughout the North and West the party tended to attract those who thought of themselves as "the better sort." It seemed the guardian of respectability, morality, and standing. In those regions the party appealed to most of the people alarmed at the growth of class antagonisms: middle-class reformers, Brahmin intelligentsia, the more substantial workingmen (to whom it offered restriction as a supplement to tariff protection), and the great bulk of white-collar folk conscious of status and tradition. Furthermore, in the East, where the immigration question was most pressing, the Democratic party since its inception had allied itself with the foreign-born. This alliance, cemented by the Irish, disqualified it as an instrument of nativism.

In the 1880's, restrictionists got no farther than the laws of 1882 and 1885, both designed to meet specific, local situations. Although nativist clamor produced a number of bills and a widely publicized Congressional investigation,\(^*\) no action occurred until 1890, when anti-foreign sentiment was becoming more widespread. Then William E. Chandler, a veteran Republican stalwart from New Hampshire, took charge of the Senate's first standing committee on immigration and, together with a House committee, launched a determined drive for stiffer controls.

The first objective was to establish thoroughgoing and effective federal regulation. Neither of the measures enacted in the previous decade was functioning well. The immigration law of 1882 left a conflicting division of authority between federal officials and the unpaid charity agents to whom the seaboard states delegated the actual work of inspecting immigrants. The contract labor law of 1885 did not touch the large number of immigrants who made no contracts abroad and paid their own passage on the strength of promises or advertisements of jobs circulated by steamship companies or other interests.\(^*\) In order not to jeopardize legislation correcting these conditions, the immigration committees temporarily put aside plans for reducing the absolute number of immigrants and concentrated instead on regulation and "selection."

The outcome was the law of 1891, which laid a permanent administrative foundation for national control of immigration. First of all, the statute placed immigration wholly under federal authority. The year before the federal government, aggravated by the lax ways of New York's Board of Emigration Commissioners, had terminated its contract with the latter, had assumed sole jurisdiction over immigration at the port of New York, and had begun to build on U. S.-owned Ellis Island the depot which will be remembered as long as the story of the immigrants survives.\(^*\) The new law confirmed this situation and made it general.

Secondly, the act prescribed practical means of enforcing existing regulations. It compelled steamship companies to carry back to Europe all passengers rejected by the United States inspectors. This had the effect of making the private ticket agents in Europe America's most effective immigration inspectors, since the com-
panies held their agents responsible for the return passage. Equally important, the act contained the first effective provision for de- porting aliens already in the United States. Aliens who entered il-
legally might be expelled within one year. So could any alien who
became a public charge during that time "from causes existing
prior to his landing." Third, the act added further excluded cate-
gories to those of 1882 and 1885. Polygamists and "persons suffer-
ing from a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease" were de-
clared inadmissible; and the contract labor law was broadened to
exclude immigrants encouraged by employers' advertisements.
Such solicitations also became illegal in themselves.77

This act remained the framework of America's immigration
policy for many years; but though tighter and more extensive, the
regulations left the nativists far from satisfied. Chandler's Senate
committee quickly turned some of its attention to schemes for re-
striction. In the fall of 1892 events seemed suddenly to play into
its hands. Cholera had crept out of Asia into eastern Europe two
years earlier; now it rode into New York harbor on an immigrant
ship of the Hamburg-American line. In the general excitement that
followed, President Harrison proclaimed a special quarantine, or-
dering the detention for twenty days of any ship carrying immi-
grants to the United States. This had the effect of bringing immi-
gration almost to a standstill for a time.78 It also gave the restric-
tionists an opening. With infection knocking at the gates and the
President's action a stopgap measure, perhaps they could stampede
Congress into suspending all immigration for one year and then
use that time to put across a permanent system of restriction.
The rank and file of legislators, however, would not be stampeded.
Instead of acting on the suspension bill which Chandler's committee
reported, Congress reformed America's crude public health laws.
As a substitute for compulsory suspension, a provision of the new
Quarantine Act gave the President permission to halt immigration
if he deemed the regular procedures inadequate.79 Neither Harrison
nor his successors invoked that power.

In those early years before the depression galvanized nativism
into a nation-wide crusade, the most popular scheme for perma-
nently restricting immigration involved the requirement of a cer-
tificate from an American consul overseas attesting to the good
character of each emigrant from his area. This idea, proposed as
early as 1837, gained new popularity in the late 1880's.80 After
1890 its most persistent champion was William A. Stone, a Repub-
lican Congressman from Pennsylvania. At the behest of the Junior
Order United American Mechanics and other nativist societies in
Pennsylvania, Stone worked hard for a measure combining con-
sular inspection with exclusion of anarchists and a stiff head tax of
$20 on all immigrants. When this failed, he cut out the latter two
provisions and offered consular inspection by itself. The watered-
down bill finally passed the House of Representatives in 1894, but
the Democrats who controlled the Senate substituted an entirely
innocuous measure, and a deadlock between the two houses en-
sued.81

Meanwhile a restrictive plan more radical than the consular-cer-
tificate idea was slowly coming forward. The progressive econo-
mist Edward W. Bemis, one of the first intellectuals to perceive
a shift in the sources of immigration, proposed in a series of lec-
tures in 1887 that the United States should exclude all male adults
unable to read and write their own language. This, he contended,
would help American wage-earners by reducing by 50 per cent
the influx of nationalities with a low standard of living—the Ita-
lrians, Poles, and Hungarians. The proposal made no headway until
Henry Cabot Lodge took it up early in 1891. For him and for most
subsequent advocates it was chiefly a means of discriminating
against "alien races" rather than of elevating American work-
men. The literacy restrictionists realized that consular inspection
would not discriminate between nationalities and that a large head
tax would establish a blatantly undemocratic property qualifica-
tion. The literacy test, on the other hand, provided a highly "re-
spectable" cultural determinant which would also minister to
Anglo-Saxon sensibilities. "No one," said Senator Chandler in 1892,
"has suggested a race distinction. We are confronted with the
fact, however, that the poorest immigrants do come from certain
races."82

Now with Chandler's help, Lodge pressed for the literacy test
at every opportunity; and the increasing antipathy toward the new
immigration strengthened his hand. He was still far from victory
when two events in 1894 brought a host of new adherents. In that
disaster-ridden year Congress felt the full consequences of the de-
pression. The fall elections swept the Democrats from control of
the Senate and installed Republican majorities in both houses. The Republicans would now have the power to carry a thoroughgoing restrictive measure. At about the same time the Immigration Restriction League appeared in Boston and commenced a remarkable, nation-wide campaign to guide public opinion toward the literacy test.

The league was born at a meeting of five young bluestocks in the law office of Charles Warren, later a noted constitutional historian. Although the founders hoped for a time to build the league into a mass movement, its active members never exceeded a handful. Probably no more than twelve ever came to a meeting. The founders were practical-minded intellectuals from well-to-do, long-established families, steeped in Boston ways and Boston ideas. They had all attended Harvard College in the late 1880's and had then gone on to graduate work in the Lawrence Scientific School or the Harvard Law School. They were determined to mount a counteroffensive against the strange invaders who seemed so grave a threat to their class, their region, their country, and their race.

From beginning to end, two men dominated the league. The more aggressive of them, Prescott F. Hall, had just opened a legal practice. He had a variety of interests, but for the rest of his life nothing ever mattered as much to him as the league. He was a gaunt, sunken-eyed figure, the product of an intensely over-protected childhood in an old Boston family, and throughout life he struggled continually with insomnia and ill health. But his mind was sharp and arrogant and proud. At Harvard he developed a passion for Wagnerian music and German philosophy and a lifelong interest in medicine and biology. His classmate Robert DeCourcy Ward was his right-hand man; in nineteen years Ward missed only a single league meeting except when absent from Boston. Twenty-seven years old at the league's inception, Ward was Hall's senior by one year and was about to enter a lifelong career first as instructor and then as professor of climatology at Harvard. Cooperating with them were several Boston philanthropists, including Joseph Lee, president of the Massachusetts Civic League, Samuel B. Capen, president of the Boston School Committee and of the Municipal League of Boston, and Robert T. Paine, Jr., one of the vice-presidents of the last. John Fiske was persuaded to accept the purely honorary presidency of the Immigration Restric-

tion League, and various other illustrious names graced its letterhead.

The league devoted itself single-mindedly to agitation for the literacy test. It sent speakers to address local Boston groups, it distributed propaganda leaflets throughout the country, and it engaged in direct legislative lobbying in Washington. In all this it tried to maintain a dignified and factual tone. Its first publication referred elliptically to the great danger of a change in America's race lines, but its arguments centered chiefly around data designed to prove that southern and eastern Europe—in sharp contrast to northwestern Europe—was dumping on the United States an alarming number of illiterates, paupers, criminals, and madmen who endangered the "American character" and "American citizenship." Since public opinion was ripe for these views, the league's publicity got a wide hearing. After a year's time, the league reported that over five hundred daily newspapers were receiving its literature and that the great bulk of them were reprinting part of it, sometimes in the form of editorials. The league also made a strenuous effort to sell the literacy test to organized labor, but with mixed effect.

By the time the new Republican Congress assembled in December 1895, the league had working relations with its nativist leaders. Lodge, now a Senator, introduced and took charge of a literacy bill drawn up by the league. Congressman McCall of Massachusetts submitted the same bill to the House of Representatives. It was stringent, providing for the exclusion of both men and women over fourteen years of age if they could not read and write some language. Lodge led off for the measure with a violent harangue on the dangers threatening America's racial foundations, and in the House, McCall also urged the literacy test as a clear line of distinction between the Anglo-Saxons and the southern Europeans. All of the nativist ferment of the past ten years was now coming to a head in an atmosphere of unrelied depression, intense jingoism, and great political tension. During the spring of 1896 a sudden revival of Italian immigration added a final impetus to the restriction movement. All immigration had slacked off in the early years of the depression. Now a new wave of Italian migrants nearly swamped the facilities at Ellis Island.

One factor still gave the politicians pause. Would the literacy
test win or lose votes for the party that carried it? Public opinion seemed overwhelmingly favorable to some form of restriction, but what of the immigrants? As yet southern and eastern Europeans counted for little in American politics, but the older immigrant groups counted for much, and their attitude was by no means certain. Party managers pointed out the danger of taking up the question on the eve of a national election. In the House, however, they failed to suppress the issue. In two days of fierce debate, the bill passed by 195 to 26. Lodge had less success forcing a vote in the Senate. The best he could do was to secure an agreement which left the bill as unfinished business to be called up when Congress reconvened after the elections.

As soon as the new session opened in December, the Republican Senate caucus pressed for action on the immigration bill. With the help of most of the Democratic Senators, the literacy test won by a topheavy margin. Supreme confident, the jubilant restrictionists then secured a conference committee which “harmonized” the House and Senate versions by writing a more drastic measure than either house alone had adopted.

But the conferees had gravely miscalculated. The crest of nativism had passed. It started ebbing the moment that William Jennings Bryan lost the election of 1896. In the midst of immense relief at the triumph of McKinley and of the status quo, alert conservatives noted an astonishing fact. Foreign-born voters in half a dozen midwestern states had much to do with the Republican victory. Without their overwhelming support, McKinley might well have lost. In the light of immigrant conservatism, anti-radical nativism began to seem less relevant. Furthermore, a vociferous immigrant opposition to the literacy test was crystallizing. German newspapers, which were keenly conscious of their political influence, were especially outspoken against the bill; moreover, the federal immigration commissioner reported that the entire foreign-language press condemned it. By February 1897, when the final conference report came before the Senate, this opposition was taking effect. The report went through by a bare majority.

Now it seemed clear that the Lodge forces in the Senate lacked the votes to override a Presidential veto if Grover Cleveland chose to disapprove the bill. And disapprove he did. Partly he objected to a House amendment of the original league bill prohibiting Canadian residents from crossing the border to work in the United States, a clause certain to stir up ill will in Canada. But his main contentions ran against the literacy test itself. A man with a strong sense of personal integrity and a steady faith in the ways of the fathers, Cleveland denounced the bill for upsetting tradition and hinted that the criterion of illiteracy was hypocritical. Don’t make illiteracy a pretext for exclusion, he said in effect, if what you fear is something else. The House of Representatives speedily overrode the veto; the Senate took no action.

With assurance unshaken, the Immigration Restriction League and its allies looked forward to confronting a more sympathetic President with similar legislation in the following year. How could they know that an era in the history of nativism was coming to an end? How could they know that sixteen years would pass before another Congress submitted to another President the proposal which Edward Bennis had devised?
special version see George Perkins Marsh, *The Geotk in New England* (Middlebury, 1843). Until Turner began to write at the turn of the century, the term Anglo-Saxon referred simply to a language, not to a race. See *Encyclopaedia; or, A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and Miscellaneous Literature* (Philadelphia, 1798), II, 7.


### Notes to Chapter Two


Strong, an outraged gentleman who could hardly contain his loathing for the rioters, nevertheless observed that a revived Know-Nothingism would be under the disadvantage of having to discriminate between Irish and Germans since the latter had behaved so well. "A mere anti-Hibernian party would have no foundation on principle; would seem merely vindictive and proscriptive, and would lead to no lasting result, I fear" (p. 343). (Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.)


24. _Celebration of the 4th of July, 1877, by the Sons of Revolutionary Sire on San Francisco, California_ (n.p., n.d.).


26. George W. Julian, _Speeches on Political Questions_ (New York, 1871), 113. For the democratic theme see also San Francisco _Alta California_ quoted in _Astronomy_, IV (1851), 21.

27. _The Writings of James Russell Lowell_ (Boston, 1890), V, 310-11; Elbridge Mulford, _The Nation_ (Boston, 1870), 397. For other applications of Christian and democratic values to the question of assimilation see _Nation_, II (1866), 648; George Moor, "The Favorable References to the Foreign Element in the Hebrew History," _Bibliotheca Sacra_, XXVII


35. Dilke, _Greater Britain_, 29; _How to Become a Member of the United American Mechanics, Together with the Laws of the Life Insurance Department_ (New York, 1881), 4; Gerard, _Impress of Nationalities_, 32; Porter, _Platforms_, 61, 70, Abbott, _Historical Aspects_, 843.

36. _The Poems of Emma Lazarus_ (Boston, 1889), I, 202-203.

37. Chamberlin, _Foreign Elements_, 770.


41. Smalley, "German Element," 359.


43. Henry Seidel Canby, American Memoir (Boston, 1937), 22-24; Hutchinson Hapgood, A Victorian in the Modern World (New York, 1939), 10; Robert Morris Lovett, All Our Years (New York, 1948), 20. Boyhood battles with other nationalities seem to have been infrequent, although Theodore C. Blegen mentions a Yankee-Norwegian episode in Grass Roots History (Minneapolis, 1947), 99.


47. Nina Morais, "Jewish Ostracism in America," North American Review, CXXIII (1881), 269-70; Saturday Evening Gazette quoted in Jewish Messenger, XLVI (August 1, 1879), 2; Alice Hyman Rhine, "Race Prejudice at Summer Resorts," Forum, III (1889), 525. See also the cartoons in Life, XIII (1889), 258-59, 334-35.


50. Charles Richard Williams, The Life of Ruford Birdchard Hayes (Boston, 1914), I, 397-401; William B. Hesseleby, Ubisoft S. Grants, Politician (New York, 1935), 390-91. The speech is reprinted in Ed-
NOTES TO PAGES 32-39
64. Joseph Parrish Thompson, *Church and State in the United States* (Boston, 1873), 165. The impact of Darwinism on race-thinking is considered more closely in Chapter VI following.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE
2. *New York Tribune*, March 31, 1894, p. 4; *History of Cincinnati and Hamilton County, Ohio: Their Past and Present* (Cincinnati, 1894), 337-77.
5. Joseph Strong, *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis* (New York, 1885), 40-45, 57, 92-150, 143. Strong's well-known Anglo-Saxon imperialism did not enter into his fear of immigration. He expected no change in America's racial composition because of immigration, and he was convinced that Christianity could not only solve the other social problems but also easily Americanize the immigrant; *ibid.*, 148-49, 171, 210.

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Washington, 1890, 1, 3. The text of the 1887 measure is in United States Statutes at Large, XXIV, 476-77.


19. Reports of the Immigration Commission (61 Cong., 3 Sess., Senate Doc. No. 758), 30-32, 97-98; Conference of Charities, Proceedings, 1876, pp. 162-70, 1890, p. 275; New York Tribune, January 19, 1898, p. 8, January 21, 1898, p. 1, and April 5, 1891, p. 2; Cong. Rec., 47 Cong., 1 Sess., 510-08, 5113. An anti-Chinese law in 1875 included general provisions forbidding the "importation" of prostitutes and the immigration of convicts. This is often taken as the beginning of federal regulation of immigration, but it was apparently a dead letter. The law excited no debate in Congress or discussion in the eastern press. Cong. Rec., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., 1599, 2161; Philadelphia Public Ledger, March 4, 1875. The law in 1882 was entirely divorced from the Chinese question.


24. Rodman W. Paul, "The Origin of the Chinese Issue in California," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXV (1938), 181-96; Josiah Royce, California from the Conquest in 1846 to the Second Vigilance Committee in San Francisco: A Study of American Character (New York, 1948), 281-85; Frederic J. Stimson, American Statute Law (Boston, 1885), I, 663. Early provisions on the licensing of auctioneers in Michigan and Minnesota refer to citizens of the state or to legal voters, but the phraseology does not suggest discriminatory intent; Compiled


29. Local Pennsylvania newspaper quoted in New York Times, February 18, 1884, p. 2; see also Times editorial, June 2, 1874, p. 4.

30. American Annual Cyclopaedia and Register of Important Events, 1874, p. 683; Testimony Taken by the Select Committee of the House of Representatives to Inquire into the Alleged Violation of the Laws Prohibiting the Importation of Contract Laborers, Puppers, Convicts, and Other Classes (50 Cong., 1 Sess., House Miscellaneous Document No. 572, Washington, 1888), 603-604. For the general reception of the immigrants in the coal region see Peter Roberts, Anthracite Coal Communities (New York, 1904), 37.


35. Hourwich, Immigration and Labor, 330-33, 553; Frederick A. Bushee, Ethnic Factors in the Population of Boston (New York, 1903), 83; San Francisco Argonaut, April 3, 1886, p. 1.


39. American Manufacturer and Iron World (Pittsburgh), January 22-29 and March 5, 1886; Bradstreet's, XIII (1886), 369.
39. *Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the National Board of Trade*, 1888, pp. 138-41; Wisconsin Bureau of Labor, *Second Biennial Report*, 1885-1886, pp. 416-30. The two polls are not strictly comparable, since the employers were asked for their views on restriction, whereas the employees were asked the narrower question of whether they believed immigration was injuring their trade. Still, a comparison is suggestive. Whereas 43% of workers felt that immigration injured them as against 59% who did not, employers divided 46 to 63 on the issue of restriction. No answer was received from 150 workers and from 272 employers. Among the 460 pro-restrictionist employers, 70 favored total prohibition.


42. The first quotation comes from Harry Barnard, "Eagle Forgotten": *The Life of John Peter Altgeld* (Indianapolis, 1938), 133. The rest are drawn from *Public Opinion*, I (1885), 82-86, III (1887), 49, and V (1889), 432.


46. *American Standard* (San Francisco), 1889: May 25, p. 1; July 6, pp. 1-5; October 5, p. 2; October 19, p. 2.


51. Patriotic Order Sons of America, *Camp News*, XVI (1893), 264; F. W. Hendley to Henry Baldwin, February 27, 1888, and January 21, 1891, in Henry Baldwin Papers (Manuscript Division, New York Public Library); Agatha Beamer to Baldwin, n.d., *ibid*.


1 have assumed throughout this section that organized nativist groups fairly reflect the social concentration of nativist sentiment. On the social composition of the whole organized nativist movement see G. G. Minor to Henry Baldwin, September 14, 1889, and Henry Baldwin to John W. Hoyt, October 22, 1891, in Baldwin Papers.

56. J. Edward Johnson to Henry Baldwin, September 1, 1889, in Baldwin Papers.


59. James M. King, *Facing the Twentieth Century: Our Country, Its Power and Peril* (New York, 1899), 510-24; *First Annual Report of the General Secretary of the National League for the Protection of American Institutions* (1890). Exceptional among anti-Catholic organizations in its upper-class background, the league was too genteel to attract a mass following. A nativist critic complained that "they will circulate a little printed stuff and then drop off in their easy chairs—and say they are too old for political work," Andrew Powell to Henry Baldwin, September 3, 1889, in Baldwin Papers.


63. "Collection of Newspaper Clippings Relating to the Situation of the Roman Catholic Church in America" (New York Public Library), I.

70. New York Tribune, June 13, 1882, p. 8. See also the characterization and comparison of Italians and Jews in Testimony Taken by the Select Committee (50 Cong., 1 Sess., House Misc. Doc. 571), 216.


NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. Manufacturer's Gazette, XVII (January 31, 1891), 6; Commercial and Financial Chronicle, LV (1892), 162; Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Meeting of the National Board of Trade, 1892, pp. 118-119, 122-125. See also Bradstreet's, XX (1892), 6; Iron Age, LI (1893), 81.


4. J. R. Leeser, President, Boston Merchants Association, to Grover Cleveland, February 20, 1897, in Grover Cleveland Papers (Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress); Publications of the Immigration Restriction League, No. 18, pp. 3-4.

5. Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Knights of Labor, 1892, pp. 4-5, 86. In 1896 the Knights endorsed the literacy test; ibid., 1898, pp. 39-40.

6. Proceedings of the Eleventh Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor, 1893 (Bloomington, Ill., 1905), 15; Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labor (New York, 1925), II, 154, 158. On the cigarmakers see Testimony Taken by the Select Committee of the House of Representatives to Inquire into the Alleged Violation of the Laws Prohibiting the Importation of Contract Laborers, Tramps, Convicts, and Other Classes (50 Cong., 1 Sess., House Miscellaneous Document No. 577, Washington, 1888), 363-64, 394-95.


8. A.F.L., Proceedings, 1897, pp. 88-91; The Carpenter, XVII (1897), 11, 14; Boston Central Labor Union to Cleveland, February 9, 1897, in Cleveland Papers.


13. Western Rural and American Stockman, XXVIII (1890), 627; XXIX (1891), 311. Partly as a bid for labor support, the Popular party in 1892 endorsed restriction, but its candidate for President took a directly contrary view. Avery Craven and others, eds., A Documentary History of the American People (Boston, 1914), 556; James B. Weaver, A Call to Action: An Interpretation of the Great Uprising, Its Source and Causes (Des Moines, 1892), 258-81.


able proof of the need for immigration restriction; see issue of April 6, p. 6.
61. New York Tribune, September 11-12, 1897, pp. 1, 3.
66. New York Tribune, April 2, 1891, p. 2; John Chetwood, Jr., Immigration Fallacies (Boston, 1896), 146-47; Review of Reviews, III (1891), 311.
68. What was probably the first magazine article describing this ferment was friendly and sympathetic; Ida Van Eten, "Russian Jews as Desirable Immigrants," Forum, XV (1893), 172-82.
69. American Hebrew, XXX (1897), 123; Natchez Daily Democrat, January 20, 1893; Oesterreichische Wochenschrift, X (1893), 88; Allgemeine Zeitung des Judentums, LVII (December 8, 1893), appendix, 4; Cf. Woodward, Origins of New South, 188.
71. Philadelphia Public Ledger, September 19-22, 1891, p. 2; Hazefrhab, XVIII (1891), 910.
72. Lewis and North, New York Sun, March 24, 1892; Edward N. Saveth, American Historians and Foreign Immigrants, 1871-1925 (New York, 1948), 65-69; Cong. Rec., 54 Cong., 1 Sess., 5215; Outlook, LI (1895), 291.
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88. Safford, Immigration Problems, 165-67; Review of Reviews, VI (1892), 263; Alien Immigration (British Parliamentary Papers, Vol. 71), 48-49.
89. Review of Reviews, VII (1893), 2; Reports of the Immigration Commission (61 Cong., 3 Sess., Senate Doc. 798), 42, 93; Cong. Rec., 51 Cong., 2 sess., 290, 717, 750-52.
91. Immigration Investigation (51 Cong., 1 Sess., House Report 2090), 681-694; Cong. Rec., 53 Cong., 2 Sess., 7756, 8216-17, 8215-17, 8244.
96. Publications of the Immigration Restriction League, Nos. 1-9; I.R.L. to members, October 23, 1895, in Files of the I.R.L., Box 2; Boston Globe, October 8, 1894.
98. New York Tribune, April 14, 1896, p. 5; and April 24, 1896, p. 3; Philadelphia Public Ledger, May 11, 1896, p. 3; Bliss, Encyclopedia, 744.
100. Philadelphia Public Ledger, June 6, 1896, p. 17, and December 7, 1896, p. 1; Cong. Rec., 54 Cong., 1 sess., 6248-49.
102. Nation, LXIII (1896), 359; Bradstreet's, XXIV (1896), 741; Cong. Rec., 54 Cong., 2 sess., 172-73.

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104. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington, 1898), IX, 758-59. On the Canadian issue see Boston Transcript, February 20, 1897; Parke, Davis & Company to Cleveland, February 20, 1897, and John B. Riley to Cleveland, February 24, 1897, in Cleveland Papers.

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3. Outlook, LVIII (1898), 500, and LX (1898), 99; Carl Schurz, "Restricting Immigration," Harper's Weekly, XLII (1898), 27; Boston Herald, February 12, 1898; Hearings: Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor (Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 76 Cong., 3 sess., Washington, 1940), part 54, pp. 1919-20.
7. See, for a partial indication, A. P. C. Griffin, Select List of References on Anglo-Saxon Interests (Washington, 1907). Racial nationalism is treated more extensively in Chapters VI and VII following.